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1The version of Article 2 voted down by NCCUSL differed from that approved by the 
ALI in three respects.  Two amendments to the proposed final draft were adopted on the floor at the 
ALI meeting.  The first eliminated the requirement of a quantity term for a record to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
The second reinstated language in §2-718 declaring unreasonably large liquidated damages agreements void as
penalties.   At the NCCUSL meeting, the drafting committee sent to the floor a revised scope provision in place of
the original (unamended) scope language approved by the ALI.  In addition, both of the floor actions approved by
the ALI membership were reversed.
2See Lance Liebman, The ALI and the UCC, 52 Hastings L. J. 645, 648-50 (2001); Lance Liebman, ALI
Director, Introduction to Website Discussion of UCC Article 2 (September 17,2001).
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THE RISE AND FALL OF ARTICLE 2
Robert E. Scott*
INTRODUCTION
On August 13, 2001 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
voted 89 to 53 to reject  the 2001 Amendments to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code that
had just been approved in May by the American Law Institute.1  The vote followed a last minute
effort by the Article 2 drafting committee to amend the scope provisions of Article 2 in response to
continuing criticism from representatives of the software and information industries.  Several months
later, at the request of the NCCUSL leadership, the revised Article 2 with its amended scope
provision was withdrawn from the agenda of the ALI Council in order to avoid its certain defeat. 
While negotiations continue, this public split between the two bodies that have together shepherded
the UCC project for over fifty years may well represent the end of the fourteen year effort to revise
the law of sales as embodied in Article 2. 
 This most recent action follows a concerted effort by the ALI and NCCUSL over the past
several years to remove controversial proposals from the Article 2 revision process so as to ensure
approval by both bodies and ultimate adoption by the states.2  In the process of downsizing the
“revisions” to “amendments,” the reporter and associate reporter of the original Article 2 drafting
3See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L. J. 607, 610-
612 (2001).
4Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10  Fla . L. Rev.  367, 378 (1957).
5This prediction was first made at a roundtable discussion at the AALS Conference in January, 1994, at
which Alan Schwartz and I presented a draft of our paper, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures [143 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995].  The Reporter and Associate Reporter of the Article 2 Drafting Committee, who were in
the audience, strongly disputed the accuracy of the prediction.  See Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can
Do?, 52 Hastings L. J. 677, 680-81 (2001). 
6Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev.
595, 607-37 (1995).
7In the article we offered three central claims, two that are relevant to the Article 2 process and a third
that is relevant to understanding Articles 3,4 and 9.  The third claim is that where there is only one interest group
that is dominant in the law reform process, the private legislature will tend to generate proposals with many bright-
line, clear rules. Again, these rules will result not solely because of their inherent merits but because they confine
the discretion of courts and thus preserve the victory of the interest group in the legislative process. See Schwartz
& Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, supra note -- at 637-650.
8See Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note ---at ---.; Allen R. Kamp,  Downtown Code: A
History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 Buffalo L. Rev. 359 (2001).
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committee, who had worked on the project for over a decade, resigned in protest.3  But the effort to
sanitize Article 2 was ultimately unsuccessful as industry and consumer interests squared off against
one another to produce the current deadlock.  Thus, even if the ALI and NCCUSL are eventually able
to overcome their differences,  Article 2 is likely to remain substantially unrevised.  As a
consequence, the statute that Karl Llewellyn called the “heart and soul” of the Uniform Commercial
Code 4 will inevitably become less relevant to the legal regulation of commercial sales transactions. 
The outcome of the Article 2 revision process was predictable. Indeed, it was predicted.5 
More than six years ago, Alan Schwartz and I developed a model for analyzing the nature of the law
reform proposals that are generated by private legislatures such as the ALI and NCCUSL.6  Our
analysis led to three predictions, two of which are relevant to explaining the rise and the fall of
Article 2.7  The first prediction is consistent with the well documented history of the drafting and
adoption of the original Article 2.8  We predicted that, in the absence of influence from outside
interest groups, these private legislative bodies will tend to promulgate many vague rules that
delegate substantial discretion to courts.  Such rules result not solely because of their intrinsic merits
but  because law reform projects of this sort are dominated by academic reformers with preferences
that are typically far different from those of the median member of the legislative body.  The
reformers propose vague rules when they are unable to get clear, bright-line rules adopted.  The
original Article 2 project was, in fact, dominated by Karl Llewellyn and a cohort of  fellow
9  See Allen R.  Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note – at 392-98 (2001).   The disparity in normative
views between the academic reformers and the business lawyers who dominated the ALI and NCCUSL was
especially sharp with respect to key issues such as the appropriate scope of freedom of contract.  William
Schnader, an influential lawyer who  was the political manager of the Code, was hesitant to incorporate
amendments suggested by the academic reformers because they represented views so far from the rank and file of
the ALI and NCCUSL membership, See Robert Braucher, A Look at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee:
A Panel Discussion, 26 Bus. Law.  307, 307 (1970) . 
10Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note -- at 648-650.
11Following the defeat of the ALI proposal at the NCCUSL meetings, the ALI established a web site to
assess reaction by ALI members and non-members to the controversy over the scope of Article 2.  As one of the
final postings noted, “as the hour approaches for this forum to close, I note that there are only 25 postings from 15
ALI members, despite the fact that the forum was extended to allow more time for comment.  This suggests to me
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reformers, and their political preferences were far from those of the ALI and NCCUSL members who
were considering the UCC during the 1940's and ‘50's.9  Moreover, the original Article 2 is famous
for its many open ended, undefined terms. The use of generalized guides to decision such as custom
and usage as well as vague, open-ended terms (such as reasonableness, good faith and
unconscionability) necessarily requires subsequent adjudication to give content to the parties
obligations in particular cases.   
The current Article 2 revision process, on the other hand, tends to confirm the second
prediction.  Unlike the  reformer-dominated processes that characterized the initial drafting and
enactment of Article 2, the recent revision process saw the emergence of cohesive and competing
interest groups.  When interest groups compete, we predicted that the strong institutional bias of these
private legislatures to behave conservatively will be reinforced.10 Cohesive interest groups are able
successfully to block the proposals of the groups they oppose but are unable to get their own
proposals enacted.  The noise resulting from their competition leads the private legislature to reject
any significant reform in favor of the status quo. Indeed, as the unsuccessful  efforts to strip Article 2
of controversy over the past two years have shown, a strong enough status quo bias can induce
rejection of even apparently innocuous proposals.
But, as is often the case, explaining one puzzle only serves to uncover another.  What explains
why the initial drafting process of Article 2 appears to track the first prediction (a reformer-
dominated process that produced many vague and open-ended rules), while the Article 2 revision
process is consistent with the second prediction (a process dominated by competing interest groups
that retains the status quo)?  A key to unlocking this puzzle is another peculiar artifact of the current
contretemps over Article 2.  Practically no one who might be thought affected by the process has
seemed to care about the demise of the revisions except the interest group participants themselves and
the hardy band of academic reformers who were promoting them.11  The collapse of efforts to revise
that the proposed scope provision either is not opposed by, or not a topic of great interest to the overwhelming
majority of our thousands of members.”  Posting by ALI member Mary Jo Dively, 10/26/01.  
12 The immediate, if not ultimate, cause of the split between the ALI and NCCUSL concerned how best to 
delineate the proper jurisdiction as between Article 2, the common law and the proposed Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) over transactions involving combinations of goods and computer programs. 
The relevant questions, among others, are:  Does Article 2 apply to the computer software that is included with a
sale of goods?  To what extent does Article 2 apply to so-called “smart goods” where the software is embedded in
the goods themselves? See TAN infra. 
13 The reference to consumer buyers does not imply that all such end use buyers are individual purchasers
who are “represented” by consumer advocacy groups such as Consumers Union.   To be sure, consumer advocacy
groups have been involved in the process, but, in addition, many of the organized consumer interests consist of
large firm licensees of computer information and their lawyers.  See note 124 infra.
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“the heart and soul of the Code” has been greeted with silence throughout the commercial community. 
 I suggest that nobody but the participants has seemed to care for the simple reason that,
to the rest of the commercial world, Article 2 has become largely irrelevant.  What has
happened?  There is evidence that  large groups of commercial contractors have opted out of the
sales provisions of the Code.  Private arbitration is used to enforce  industry-created default
rules and standard form terms that have been designed to replace the default rules of Article 2. 
The opting out by commercial interests, extending over many years, would mean that the
principal remaining function of Article 2 is to regulate mass-market sales transactions.  Many of
those transactions implicate the licensing of computer information as well.12    The interest
group competition thus arises in the clash between the representatives of retail sellers (and
licensors)  and consumer buyers (and licensees) over the appropriate scope of market
regulation of standard form contracting.13
In this Essay, I examine the political economy of the Article 2 project from its origins to
the present.  Part I begins with the two normative questions that have preoccupied contract
theorists for more than a century: What is the proper domain of freedom of contract? And,
within that domain, how should the law complete the gaps in incomplete contracts?  I focus on
Llewellyn’s unique conception that these apparently separate questions are, in fact, aspects of a
single institutional objective, a conception that formed the normative foundation of Article 2.  In
Part II, I analyze the drafting and enactment process of the original Article 2 and evaluate the
success of the new sales law it introduced, a success attributable in no small measure to the
replacement of archaic vestiges of property law with efficient contract default rules.  In Part III,
I consider the effects of the compromises Llewellyn made to secure the enactment of the Code.  
Of particular significance is how the vague terms that invoke the  commercial context
14 This conclusion is qualified in the discussion that follows.  Deadlock only results when the
distributional effects are both asymmetric and concentrated so as to stimulate interest group competition.  Where
the distributional effects are asymmetric but the gains are concentrated and the losses diffused  (as is arguably the
case with respect to Articles 3, 4 and 9), the evidence is that the process “works” in the sense that uniform
enactment can be achieved but only at the cost of potentially regressive distributional effects. See TAN infra 
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(originally intended by Llewellyn as a means of incorporating ex ante default rules) have been
used to challenge the objective meaning of disputed contracts.   For many commercial parties,
exit may have been a cheaper option than lobbying for clearer and more predictable default
rules.  But the parties to mass-market sales transactions remain subject to Article 2, and their
representatives have sought to influence the revision process.  Thus, the focus has shifted from
Llewellyn’s original goal of prescribing optimal default rules for commercial contracts to the
current debate over proscribing freedom of contract in mass-market  transactions.  The resulting
divergence between the interests of producers and those of consumer buyers, computer
information licensees and their representatives has produced deadlock.
 I conclude that the flaws in the Article 2 project were present from its inception.  Given
the limits of legal regulation, it is unlikely that any  set of  “uniform” rules that are promulgated
for adoption in every state can both efficiently complete the gaps in commercial contracts as
well as optimally police consumer transactions.  The current deadlock is likely to continue as
long as the private legislators who control the UCC revision process remain determined to
pursue both of these normative objectives in the same statute. One solution would be to turn to
the ordinary legislative process to resolve the normatively controversial distributional issues
surrounding the regulation of standard form contracting.  The private legislative process could
then pursue a more modest but achievable goal: the promulgation of a limited set of efficient
sales law default rules.   In short, the uniform laws process works when there is distributional 
symmetry (when today's buyer might be tomorrow's seller).   On the other hand, the process
deadlocks when it seeks to produce uniform rules for transactions where the distributional
effects are asymmetric and prices are unlikely to adjust efficiently so as to compensate for a
single group’s victory in the legislative process.14  
I.  LLEWELLYN’S LEGACY: THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATION OF ARTICLE 2
Karl Llewellyn’s contributions to contract theory have been almost universally
misunderstood or ignored.  Part of the problem lies with Llewellyn himself and his “gnomic
15On the problems of interpreting Llewellyn, see Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal
Realism, 12 Legal Stud. 137 (1992). 
16  Others have expressed  the same point (perhaps less charitably) by noting Llewellyn’s aversion to
citing  the work of others even those who obviously influenced  his ideas.   
17 See, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 621, 624-27 (1975); Kenneth  Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl
Llewellyn, 1977 Duke L. J. 671; Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Castles in the Air: Blanket Assent and the Revision
of Article 2, 51 Wash. & Lee l. Rev. 599 (1994); William Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT 335-37 (1973).  I count myself among the culprits.  See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in
Commercial Law, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149,170-72
(2000); Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 W & M  L. Rev. 329, 341-42 (1993).
18 Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 12, 14-17 (2000)
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prose.”15  Llewellyn was an unusually creative thinker, but he was not a theorist in the classic
sense and he rarely bothered to link his often counter-intuitive ideas to the intellectual context of
his day.16  But equally culpable are many of the scholars who have interpreted Llewellyn’s
writings over the past thirty years.  A typical, and fundamental, error has been to use his later
jurisprudential writings rather than his earlier work on contract to analyze and interpret his
meaning and intent as the principal drafter of Article 2 of the UCC.17  Alan Schwartz has
recently reminded us that, contrary to conventional wisdom,  Llewellyn was not a rule skeptic
and that his contributions to contract theory include a commitment to ex ante default rules
empirically grounded in industry practice.18 Part of the confusion lies in the fact that
Llewellyn’s commitment to filling contractual gaps by providing parties with more tailored and
apt defaults was tempered by his skepticism about the terms that are generated by “unbalanced”
bargains between parties of unequal bargaining power. Thus, Llewellyn’s views on contract
straddle the divide between the debate over default rules and the debate over freedom of
contract.  It is simply impossible to appreciate Llewellyn’s unique vision, a vision that formed
the normative foundation of Article 2, without first understanding the fault lines that characterize
these debates.
  A.  An Introduction to the Normative Debates in Contract Theory.
 In order to assess the degree to which Llewellyn’s Article 2  accomplished its
objectives, we must first specify what those objectives are. Article 2 regulates contracts for the
sale of goods and, as such, the statute draws its normative justification from modern contract
theory. The first objective of contract theory is to resolve a basic sorting problem.  Our legal
system does not enforce all promises, not even all those that were seriously intended.  Thus, a
normative theory of contract must first explain why certain bargained for  promises deserve a
19 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1913-18
(1992).  According to the convergence hypothesis, contract law promotes both autonomy and social welfare
(efficiency) and, therefore, both viewpoints will converge on the substantive content of contract law (although the
bases for their recommendations may not be compatible). Jody  S. Kraus, The Methodological Commitments of
Contemporary Contract Theory (forthcoming 2002).  Michael Tribelcock considers and then rejects the
convergence hypothesis in THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993).  For a discussion of how both theories
might be combined to produce an overall theory of contract, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and
Efficiency in Contract Law:  The Vertical Integration Strategy, Philosophical Theory (forthcoming 2002).  For a
limited Rawlsian justification for choosing efficient rules in particular legal contexts, see Daniel A. Farber,
Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
54 (2000).
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presumption of enforceability in the first place. One response is that the freedom to exchange
entitlements presupposes the freedom to contract for such an exchange.  Either freedom is
supported by norms of efficiency and autonomy.  Parties who are denied either freedom to
contract or freedom to exchange entitlements suffer unnecessary constraints on their choices,
constraints that undermine the value of the entitlements themselves. Thus, the normative claim
that supports enforcing bargains is that voluntary exchange offers individuals more choices than
they would otherwise enjoy and, other things being equal, more choice is better than less. This
norm of expanded choice is so powerful in ordinary contracts that it justifies not only the state
subsidization of an enforcement mechanism, but also an array of default rules that delineate the
terms of typical bargains, terms that define the contractual relationship unless the parties design
their own alternatives.19 
Article 2 accepts implicitly the premises of this dominant bargain theory paradigm. But
this paradigm does not prescribe the set of enforceable promises, nor does it prescribe the
nature of the default rules that fill the gaps in incomplete contracts.  Thus, contract theory must
grapple with the two questions that lie at the heart of any justification for the state’s coercive
enforcement of a promise against a reluctant promisor. The first, what we might call the
“distributional” question, asks: What is the proper domain of freedom of contract?  The second,
“efficiency” question, asks: Within that domain, what is the appropriate role of the state in
regulating incomplete contracts?  Although these two questions intersect at various points, they
are quite separate and distinct.  Thus, the story of Article 2 is, at bottom, the story of how one
statutory scheme has sought to answer both of these questions.
1.  Policing Bargains: The Limits of  “Free Contract.” While modern contract theory
supports a presumption favoring the enforcement of bargains, it is also the source of many
arguments for prohibiting certain bargains, or at least substantially restricting them.  It might
seem strange to look to contract theory to find reasons for prohibiting certain contracts, but
20Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note — at 1918.
21Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 393-95 (3d ed. 2002)
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contract law routinely embraces arguments for limiting itself.  Those arguments are of two
general types.  One class focuses on defects in the bargaining process.   Accepting for the
moment the appeal of the expanded choice norm, the challenge for contract theory is how to
preserve its key elements: a free, informed, and rational choice.  Preserving the core of this
idea requires rules that prohibit enforcement where individual promises were the product of
duress, fraud or unconscionable information deficits, or where the parties lacked the capacity
and judgment to evaluate the risk being exchanged.20 
Those contract arguments that focus on process defects require a mechanism by which
courts (or other decision makers) can screen defective process from those engagements that
deserve enforcement.  As is the case with any legal regime, two approaches to screening are
possible.  The first is to draw bright line rules that are easy to administer in particular cases. 
The advantages of this approach, the one most commonly found in the common law of contract,
are relatively low costs of adjudication and relatively high transparency of the law to
prospective contractors.  The disadvantage is that bright line rules are inevitably over and
under inclusive; that is, the underlying justification of a particular rule argues against allowing
some cases that the rule permits, and in favor of allowing some cases the rule prohibits.  In
short, rules by nature cannot be tailored on a case by case basis to conform to the underlying
goals the rules are designed to advance.  The second screening method, the one favored in
Article 2, most famously in the doctrine of unconscionability, is to use vague standards that
allow for case-by-case tailoring.  The disadvantages of this approach are its relatively higher
costs of administration and its relatively lower degree of transparency to potential contractors. 
Adjudication costs will be higher because it will be more time-consuming and intellectually
challenging for judges or juries to decide how to apply standards in individual cases. 
Transparency will be lower because the variance among outcomes of similar cases will be
higher.  This not only increases the costs of transacting, but also increases the problem of
unfairness due to unequal treatment among like cases.  At some point, a decision maker might
conclude that screening errors are so substantial with either approach as to justify a
prophylactic rule prohibiting a class of bargains altogether.21
A second class of objections to enforcement focuses more directly on the outcome of
certain bargains.  The idea here is that the bargains themselves are faulty, regardless of whether
the bargaining process was informed and voluntary.  Thus, for example, contracts of
enslavement are uncontroversially unenforceable.  That familiar restriction on contractual
22Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, supra note --- at 1928-30.
23 Anthony Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contract, 92 Yale L. J. 763 (1983)
24Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note – at 306-307 (1973).
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freedom stems from the notion that people should not bargain away too much of their liberty.22 
Contract also has a tradition of non enforcement for more systemic reasons, based on how
contractual allocation affects the distribution of certain goods and services.  A classic example
is the non-waivability of warranties of habitability.  As Dean Kronman has noted, this limitation
on contractual autonomy seems to rest on society’s concern about the distribution of power with
respect to fundamental entitlements.23  Housing plausibly falls in that category as do education
and health care, two other fundamental goods that are allocated in part through non-market
mechanisms. In sales law, the salient question has typically been  whether warranty liability for
defective goods that cause personal injuries and/or  economic losses should be similarly non-
waivable.  
A few moments reflection reveals the inherent difficulty for any legal regime in
choosing the optimal screen for selecting between enforceable and unenforceable bargains on
the grounds of process deficits or in specifying the domain of permissible bargains.  The value
conflict is particularly acute when the question is posed in terms of categories of suspect
transactions beyond the traditional common law boundaries of fraud, duress, illegality and
incapacity.
 The question that attracted much of Llewellyn’s interest, and continues to trouble
contemporary theorists, is whether standard form contracting in mass market transactions–the
so-called contract of adhesion– is deserving of special scrutiny over and above the traditional
common law tests for enforceability.   Should standard form contracting between merchants be
treated differently than consumer contracts?  Are these categories even meaningful? Does free
choice require subjective assent to particular contract terms or only a “blanket” assent to terms
that are routinely  employed in market transactions?  Does the answer to the preceding question
depend on the nature of the market or the nature of the transaction within the market?  What risks
cannot be assented to under any conditions? What are the appropriate limits to paternalism? 
Given the difficulty of reaching consensus on the relevant values, it seems astonishing at first
blush that  a private law reform group drafting a proposed uniform statute would seek to reach
technical rather than political solutions to these freedom of contract questions. But that is
precisely what Llewellyn and the drafters of the original Article 2 sought to do.24  Before we
can evaluate Llewellyn’s solution to the freedom of contract debate, however, we must consider
25 For an analysis of each of these strategies and of the consequences of pursuing any one of them, see
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847,849-53 (2000). 
26 The argument in favor of the default rule strategy runs along the following lines.  In a world where
Coasian assumptions of zero transactions costs hold, the choice among gap-filling default rules is irrelevant
because parties can and will negotiate around suboptimal legal rules.  But in a world of transactions costs anything
can happen and, absent substantial data on these costs, one cannot predict with certainty that any given rule is better
than any other rule for any particular set of contracting parties.  Surely, though, some rule for allocating common
contracting risks is preferable to no rule.  If so, the law ought to adopt the rule that the broadest number of parties
would adopt were transactions costs low enough for parties to tailor-make their own rules.  A legal rule mirroring
what most parties would adopt where transactions costs are low saves those parties the time, cost and error
inherent in negotiating contract terms and reducing them to writing. The norm of expanded choice thus  justifies
this preference for majoritarian default rules.  See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the
Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. Chi L. Rev. 1155, 1172-73 (1990). 
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the choice between ex ante and ex post perspectives in completing incomplete contracts.
           2.  The Gap-Filling Function of Legal Rules.  Within the domain of free contract, what
is the appropriate role of the state in regulating incomplete contracts?  Resolving this question
requires the state first to interpret the signals that the contracting parties have used, however
imperfectly, in allocating contractual risk.  These signals include what the parties wrote (and
did not write) and said (and did not say), as well as the context in which these signals were
exchanged.  But this interpretive task is not self-executing.  It requires a court (or other decision
maker) to select among (at least) three discrete interpretive strategies.  The choice among these
strategies determines the mode of interpretation that is chosen and, consequently, the shape and
content of contract law.25  
One strategy is for the state to fill gaps in incomplete contracts objectively, so as to
maximize the ex ante value of the contract (viewed as of the time of contracting).  This strategy
is designed to protect (and even improve) the utility of the set of contracting signals for future
parties.  It requires courts to ignore the contracting parties subjective intentions and fill
contractual gaps according to assumptions about the risks that parties similarly situated would
plausibly have agreed to bear at the time the contract was made.  This is the default rule
paradigm that has occupied much of the agenda of the law-and-economics branch of contract
theory.26  Default rules expand parties choices by providing standardized and widely suitable
contract terms to cover most risk contingencies.  The expanded choice norm implicitly
presumes that the state has a neutral policy toward individualized agreements, as it has no
reason to impose its default rules on unwilling parties.  Viewed ex ante, therefore, atypical
parties lose nothing from the specification of default rules as they remain free to design
27 Where transactions costs are too high for parties to fashion their own rule, it nonetheless may be
normatively correct to provide them with the rule that they most probably would have chosen for themselves at the
time of contracting had they been able to bargain.  Atypical parties, after all, are not disadvantaged by the
specification of a “majoritarian” default rule, so long as they remain free to opt out of the default and design their
own tailor-made alternative.   This preference for “majoritarian” default rules doe not undermine the selection of
default rules designed to stimulate further negotiation.  Certain “information-forcing” default rules are set, not
because they represent the ultimate allocation preferred by most bargainers, but because they are best suited to
inducing one party to share information with the other.  See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing
Promises; An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L. J. 1261, 1300 (1980); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 597, 609-610 (1990); Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. 87
(1989).
28 See E. Allen Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L..J.  939, 947 (1967), 3 A.
Corbin, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS at 59-61 (1960).
29 Robert A.  Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract
Law, 1987 Duke L. J. 1.  Under this view, the law explicitly recognizes that courts adjudicate a contract dispute
only after the parties have failed to specify a contractual solution to the particular problem ex ante and have been
unsuccessful in bargaining their way to a solution ex post.  Assume, then, that courts are in possession of
information at the time of adjudication that the parties did not possess either ex ante or upon renegotiation.  Under
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alternatives to the state’s terms.27
The difficulty with the ex ante approach, as Llewellyn noted, was that it operates at too
high a level of generality.  Llewellyn was highly critical in the first instance of  those sales law
rules that were the product of abstract concepts such as the location of the “title” in the goods.
But, more to the point, even those defaults that are based on sensible intuitions about optimal
risk allocation are often too general to be of much use to parties in specific commercial
contexts.  What is the point of a default rule strategy based on a majoritarian selection norm if
there is no  “majority” of bargainers who would  agree ex ante on any given contract term?
There is a second strategy. Rather than attempt to specify objective default rules that fill
the gaps ex ante, the courts can seek to fill gaps subjectively from an ex post perspective.  That
is, they can fill in the “right” result by imposing an equitable adjustment of all the relational and
contextual factors that define the parties subjective “agreement” as it appears at the time of
adjudication.  This strategy was advanced by Llewellyn’s teacher, Arthur Corbin, who believed
that contractual gaps should be filled so as to effectuate the mental states of the parties.28  In the
contemporary debate, the ex post perspective is the solution most frequently suggested by the
“law-and-society” branch of contract theorists. Where subjective meaning cannot be divined, 
the argument proceeds from the claim that contracts inevitably create reciprocal “relational”
duties.  Courts, employing their informational advantage ex post, should enforce those duties
when the parties cannot agree.29   Efficiency (or fairness) of result thus replaces efficiency of
these conditions, courts should fill in the gaps ex post and direct an efficient outcome.  While under this regime
contracting parties would be unable ex ante to predict the payoffs if certain contractual risks materialized, they
would know that courts would reach an equitable adjustment that would be efficient as viewed from that vantage
point.
30For an example of linguistic ambiguity, see note 144 infra.  As for the question of whether the law can
usefully create more complex, tailored default rules, consider the doctrines of perfect tender, mistake, excuse and
breach.  These  familiar default rules of contract law are all framed in terms of generalized, categorical, winner-
take-all risk allocations. The consistent character of these rules is that they assign risks on an all or nothing basis. 
The normative claim underlying this third strategy is that binary default rules have evolved because they deal with
contracting problems in which there are only a small number of relevant future states (i.e., either the contract
goods are destroyed or they are not). But these common law defaults do not respond to incomplete contracts
where there are a very large number of possible and likely future states–i.e., where the market has price volatility. 
Because many contracting problems more closely resemble price uncertainty problems rather than the problem of
loss or destruction of goods, this suggests that there is a hard upper bound on the number of problems that the law
can solve with ex ante defaults.
31Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn,
Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169, 187-88 (1989). 
32For an evaluation of the merits (and demerits) of this approach, see  Scott, The Case for Formalism,
supra note — at 871-75.
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prediction.   While many of the legal realists were attracted to this strategy and to the notion of
subjective intent that supports it, Llewellyn, for reasons that will be explored later, did not
share this subjectivist view.
A third strategy  traces its lineage to the Willistonian approach to contract interpretation
and requires courts to decline to fill gaps except in clear cases of linguistic ambiguity or where
the law has already provided clear, binary default rules.30  Willistonian formalism rested on
two basic claims: 1) that contract terms could be interpreted according to their plain meaning;
and 2) that written terms have priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.31 Unlike
Willistonian conceptualism, the contemporary version of this strategy rests on the functionalist
justification that parties often write incomplete contracts because of problems of hidden or
private information (or because the transactions costs of specifying a complete state contingent
contract exceed expected benefits) and that, in such circumstances, courts are incapable of
doing better than the parties themselves. Under this “neo-formalist” approach, courts are
instructed not to create additional, context-sensitive defaults or to undertake ex post
adjustments.  Rather courts are asked to enforce the (facially unambiguous) express terms of the
contract literalistically or “as written,”supplemented only by the existing default rules of
contract law.32  One consequence of not filling more  contractual gaps is that courts then must
decline to enforce some contracts that are seriously incomplete, and, in consequence,
33 This third approach might be understood as a kind of global information-forcing default, one that uses
the threat of non-enforceability to encourage parties to specify the solution to certain contingencies themselves. 
For an argument that these additional specification costs may well exceed the interpretive error costs of
contextual interpretation, see Jody S. Kraus  & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, THE
JURISDICTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193 (2000). To be sure, a neo-formalist
strategy does not necessarily preclude courts from contextual interpretation of a given contract, but it does require
the parties to signal expressly their preference for more subjective modes of interpretation of the contract terms. 
The neo-formalist strategy is not as radical as its seems.  It emerges from the classic work of Stewart Macaulay
advancing the claim that flexible social norms, rather than rigid legal rules, govern commercial contracting
behavior. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 555 (1963).  Following in
Macaulay’s path, I suggested in a later article that contracting parties may have learned to behave under two sets of
rules: a strict (and formal) set of rules for legal enforcement and a more flexible (and contextualized) set of rules
for normative enforcement.  The lesson for the courts following his strategy, therefore, is to resist the temptation
to judicialize these social norms on the theory that this effort will destroy the very informality that makes them so
effective in the first instance.  Scott, Relational Theory, supra note – at 615. 
34Dennis M. Patterson, Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, supra note — at
189-190; Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
465, 505-06 (1987).
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contracting parties must expend more resources in specifying the terms of their agreements.33 
Llewellyn, who was above all a functionalist, also rejected the conceptualist
foundations of formalism.  In his view, context was the single most important determinant to the
meaning of contractual language. But Llewellyn’s rejection of formalism and embrace of context
was far different from that of Corbin and the subjectivists.  For Corbin, context was simply an
opportunity to uncover the subjective intent of the contracting parties. But Llewellyn’s view of
context was as a means of implementing fully an objective ex ante default rule approach.  In
using context to fill gaps, Llewellyn would not instruct courts to focus on what the parties
subjectively intended their words to mean in context but rather on what the trade took the
words to mean.34  In short, Llewellyn did not object to the notion that parties should be taken to
have accepted, explicitly or implicitly, a set of default terms; he objected to the manner in
which those defaults were determined. Rather than a set of abstract, generalized defaults, he
argued for defaults that were tailored to the particular commercial context.  
B.  Llewellyn’s Contributions to Contract Theory
 Most theorists have attempted to evaluate  the two core questions of contract
independently.  Thus, for example, it is a common analytical technique to assume conditions of
free contracting when evaluating the merits of the different strategies for filling contractual
gaps.  Similarly, analysts who focus on the domain of contracting assume implicitly that the
choice between expanding and contracting the field of contract is independent of the way in
35  Llewellyn called himself a “contract theorist,” stating that this role required one to “have has his first
objective to state accurately and neatly what the courts have been doing.”  Karl Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our
Case Law of Contract, 47 Yale L. J. 1243, 1259 (1938) (“A rule which states accurately the outcome of the case,
seen as cases, incorporates pro tanto such wisdom on the cases as prior courts have shown, and such similarity of
reaction as courts are likely to continue to show...[The working rule] gives some guidance to the judge about
wherein his more personal judgments on such matters may be wisely tempered. Id. at 1257) .
36 Schwartz, Origins of Contract Theory supra note – at 15-19. 
37Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society I, 36 Colum L. Rev. 699 (1936) (“ Common to all
[of these cases] is a picture of the way in which dickers of this kind typically happen, and so of how the parties
ought to have understood what was said and done.” (Emphasis added)   Id. at 722).
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which contractual gaps should be filled once one is within that domain. But for Karl Llewellyn
these two questions were linked and, moreover, linked in a way that admitted (at least in his
view) of a normatively uncontroversial solution.  Llewellyn’s solution purported both to
regulate the domain of free contract in standardized transactions and also to provide an array of
apt and appropriately tailored default rules superior to the formal and largely abstract rules that
had emerged from the common law process (and had been enshrined in Williston’s Sales Act). 
1.  Llewellyn’s View on Default Rules.  Llewellyn’s writings on contract, worked out
over a fifteen year period from 1925 to 1940,  reveal his continuing effort to resolve 
fundamental normative questions of contract theory.  Although he was dismissive of the
artificial and abstract character of legal formalism, he was not in any sense a rule skeptic. 
Rather, he believed that most legal reformers and courts took too seriously the legal rules as
reflected in taught legal doctrine.  Rather than focusing on the reasons for court decisions,
Llewellyn advocated an approach that focused on the “working rules” that were reflected in the
outcomes of decided cases.35  These patterns, in turn, were revealed by a careful classification
of the different commercial contexts in which the cases arose. Searching for the patterns of
working rules in specific commercial contexts led him to the belief that commercial practice
itself was the best source of default rules. 
 It is commonly believed that Llewellyn advocated a search for the “immanent”
commercial law – moral norms that could be derived from actual practices. But, as Alan
Schwartz has shown, Llewellyn’s contract writings show that Llewellyn believed that custom
had only an epistemological and not a normative relevance, and that courts can and should infer
the efficient rule from the standard practice.36  Thus, Llewellyn belongs clearly in the camp of
those who advocate completing incomplete contracts with ex ante default rules (which he called
“yielding rules”) that reflect the deals that typical parties would make in the circumstances.37 
Thus, for example, he wrote approvingly of the warranty provisions of the Sales Act that:
38 Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159, 197 (1938).
39Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note – at 313-321.
40 Llewellyn’s use of custom as a source of default rules did not commit him to the use of custom as a
source of meaning in contract disputes.  He recognized that custom was often unhelpful in resolving disputed
transactions (“trouble” cases) because such cases typically arose out of an exogenous shock for which the custom
-- created for typical transactions --was not applicable.  In such circumstances, he was not interested in solving
interpretive problems by inferring what the contracting parties subjectively meant or would have meant (as would
Corbin and the subjectivists ).  Nor did he approve of courts resolving trouble cases by imposing an outcome that
was fair ex post.   Rather, he thought such occasions were opportunities for courts using the resolution of such
disputes to impose efficient solutions, that is, solutions that maximized the ex ante value of the contract and/or
reduced transactions costs for future parties. See Schwartz, Origins of Contract Theory, supra note — at   15-17.
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they seek less to lay down controlling rules than to standardize, on the basis of the most
general practice discernable, the probable meaning of the acts or words concerned to
most bargainers concerned.... And this, in my view, is the sound basic approach to
regulative law about socially unobjectionable transactions which can be reasonably
standardized, and where bargaining power is moderately balanced or fair dealing is the
practice.”38
Llewellyn’s criticism of the Sales Act and Willistonian formalism was leveled against
their two major flaws: many of the defaults were inefficient (grounded as they were in legal
doctrine rather than actual practice) and others operated at too high a level of generality (they
were insensitive to the particular circumstances that might lead parties in some industries to
allocate risks differently than parties in other commercial contexts).  The default rule task,
therefore, was to direct courts to fashion both  efficient and tailored defaults.  This courts could
not do unless and until they became more acquainted with the commercial context of the
particular dispute.  Although Llewellyn was committed to an empirical foundation for contract
rules, his empirical techniques were at best indirect.  Rather than look for business practices
directly, he inferred that practice from the contractual arrangements in litigated cases.39  Parties
consent to that arrangement constituted presumptive evidence that the arrangement was efficient
and should become the legal norm for similar transactions in similar contexts.  In this way,
courts could create a menu of tailored default terms that would both constrain courts decisions
in the future and enable commercial parties to predict outcomes ex ante.40  
2.  Llewellyn and Freedom of Contract.  Llewellyn’s interest in freedom of contract
questions stemmed from his focus on litigated commercial contracts as a source of tailored
default rules.  Before one could infer that the observed practice or contract term  was efficient
for that trade or industry, one would first have to ensure that the terms in question were
“bargained for” and not “dictated” by a stronger party to a weaker one.  If the terms were
41 Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665, 673
(1925). 
42 Karl Llewellyn,  Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 725-26 (1939). 
43 Karl Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Offer and Acceptance I, 48 Yale L. J. 779 (1938).
44Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 704 (1939) (“the goal is the marking out of the
impermissible”).  
45Karl Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341, 364-65, n. 58 (1937).
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dictated in a “fiat” contract, then one could not conclude that the terms were an appropriate
source for  defaults as they might only benefit the stronger party.  This focus on “balanced”
transactions led naturally to a concern with adhesion contracts in general and with “lop sided”
contracts in particular.41 
 But Llewellyn’s concern with adhesion contracts and with delineating the domain of
free contract was narrowly focused.  He believed that distributional goals played no role in
contract: “Most of the Sales field is uncolored as most other law is not by the clash of class and
passions because the same parties and the same types of party can tomorrow be occupying each
the other end of similar disputes.”42  In short, since parties to sales transactions were both
buyers and sellers, there was no reason to believe that one group or class was distributionally
disadvantaged over the other. Thus, the goal of sales law was to “solve practical problems by
providing rules that are “practical tools for practical men.”43
The focus on balanced transactions as a source of efficient defaults (rather than as being
distributionally fair) led Llewellyn in general to prefer selective regulation of bargains rather
than mandatory rules.  His early views presaged the development of the doctrine of
unconscionability as the key mechanism for regulating bargains, especially in standard form
contracting. Contracts that were substantively objectionable or “lopsided” should not be
enforced when the bargaining process that produced them was procedurally defective.44 One
exception to this general view was his belief that warranty disclaimers should be universally
unenforceable even where the “buyer has freely agreed thereto” unless the court finds that the
“clause lies within the region of self-regulation by parties.”45  This view resulted from his
conclusion that such disclaimers were almost always the product of lop-sided contracting.  The
conclusion that warranty disclaimers justified a prophylactic rule against contracting out, in
turn, was a function of his empirical technique of inferring the efficiency of practice from
disputed cases.  Warranty disputes arise where the buyer is disappointed with the quality of
goods sold.  In that class of transactions, a term allocating the risk of quality defects to the buyer
46Id. at 403. See also Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note -- at 700-01 (“Almost any particular clause
included in a deal represents the parties’ joint judgment... and that alone is good enough for letting it ...displace and
replace the general law.”) 
47Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note -- at 704.
48Karl Llewellyn,  What Price Contract?  An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L. J. 704, n. 47, 734 (1931).
49Allen R. Kamp, Between-The-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform
Commercial Code in Context, 59 Albany L. Rev. 325, 354-365 (1995).
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seems always to deny buyers the benefit of their bargain.  Of course, the question whether such
disclaimers are sometimes an efficient means of reallocating quality risks requires as well an
analysis of those transactions where the buyer receives a lower price for the contract goods in
return for assuming a risk that never materializes.
3.  Llewellyn’s Solution to the Tension between Ex ante Defaults and Regulated
Bargains.  At first blush, Llewellyn’s views on the two normative concerns of contract theory
seem to be hopelessly inconsistent.  On the one hand, he held a strong view that parties, not
courts, should determine the terms of their contracts.  Parties should be permitted to make “any
contract they please” because the “animals probably know their own business better than their
keeper does– a theory that has not only charm but virtue most of the time.”46  On the other hand,
he advocated a theory of regulation that empowered courts to strike down and/or rewrite
contract terms whenever the contract was “unbalanced.”  To accommodate both views within a
single theory thus requires a sorting mechanism by which courts can reliably screen balanced
transactions where contracting out is freely permitted from unbalanced transactions where
courts should impose customary terms that reflect the “reasonable expectations” of the parties.47
For Llewellyn, however,  the tension was only a technical and not a normative problem. 
He did not view the regulatory function as representing a clash of interests –as between retail
sellers and consumer buyers–but rather as an exercise in policing  outlier sellers,  the “contract-
dodger” or “sharper.”48  Viewed through this lens, the regulatory task could be appropriately
confined to policing aberrant transactions without hindering the facilitation of efficient
contracting for the vast majority of contracting parties. In short, for Llewellyn, the distributional
question was derivative of the efficiency question.  Thus, he was willing to privilege the
freedom of parties to contract out of default rules over the regulatory role of courts in policing
unbalanced bargains because he viewed the former as the norm and the latter as atypical.  The
regulatory role could be properly confined because, in Llewellyn’s view, the key unit of
analysis was the group – merchants in a particular trade or practice--and the group can and
would engage in self-policing. 49 
50For an excellent discussion of the institutionalists and their influence on academic law, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 993 (1990).
51The Institutional school of economics was a distinctly American phenomenon.  It is most commonly
associated with Thorstein Veblen, W.C. Mitchell and John Commons, although their work has few common
elements.  The core of institutionalism has three methodological features: 1)dissatisfaction with the high level of
abstraction of neo-classical economics and with the static nature of orthodox price theory; 2) a belief in the
integration of economics with other social sciences, especially psychology and sociology; and 3) a belief in
detailed quantitative investigations.  See M. Blaug, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS (1980).  
52John Commons, Law and Economics, 34 Yale L. J. 371-382 (1925).  
53John Commons, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1934).
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           It is difficult to appreciate in the abstract Llewellyn’s “solution” to the tension between
party autonomy to contract out of default rules and judicial regulation of lopsided bargains.  To
those committed to contract as a distributional as well as an allocative mechanism,  it may
appear that Llewellyn too readily acquiesced in the creation of a tool for policing bargains –the
unconscionability doctrine– that was mostly form and little substance.  But for Llewellyn the
contemporary  focus on individual rights, on a methodological individualism that is shared by
both sides of the free contract divide, was unfamiliar.  Instead, he was committed to a
methodology that focused on the group as the key unit of analysis.  To understand his theory of
group behavior, including the means by which groups could, with the aid of legal tools,
effectively police themselves, one must  appreciate his commitment to the law-and-economics
of his day, the institutional economics of John Commons.50   
4.  Llewellyn’s Law and Economics.  Llewellyn was particularly influenced by the
work of John Commons and the other members of the Institutional school of economics.51 
Commons rejected the  focus of economic models on the choices made by rational, utility-
maximizing individuals  in markets devoid of institutional structures.  After all, most economic
activity involved individuals as members of groups–corporations, unions, the family, political
parties, etc.  He sought to include collective action and institutional analysis within the standard
economic models.  Commons principal contribution, therefore, was to replace the individual
with the transaction as the basic unit of analysis.52  The larger unit in Commons framework was
the “going concern.”  According to Commons, “a going concern is a joint expectation of
beneficial bargaining, managerial and rationing transactions, kept together by working
rules...and by control of the changeable strategic or limiting factors which are expected to
control others.”53
Llewellyn adopted Common’s notion of working rules (social norms in contemporary
terminology) and incorporated them as a “common law” applying not only within an economic
54Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions, supra note –  at 670.
55Id. at 671.
56 Id. at 671.
57Id.
58 “Private interests seem to have been the influential factors in law’s major changes in the past.  Their
working constitutes the striking phase of law’s relation to economics today.  Increasingly, associations are
forming which adopt their own rules of action and even settle their own disputes...” Id.
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unit but between economic units as well.  Since these rules were produced by the strategic
interactions between economic units in society, those units had an ongoing motivation to police
those members of the group who attempted to chisel or otherwise violate the norms.  Hence his
commitment to group-policing of contractual chiselers was based on a theory of the group’s
self-interest in protecting its place in the economic order. 
Because of the uniquely specialized  regulatory role of economic groups,  Llewellyn
was unwilling to delegate the primary regulatory responsibility either to courts or legislatures. 
In the case of courts, “the adjustments are and must continue laggard and partial; inelastic and
sometimes mistaken... because judges are neither industrial workers, business men nor bankers. 
Hence in the vast majority of their cases they sit as laymen, groping to solve a controversy they
cannot understand by a rule whose import they cannot guess.”54  Legislatures were little better,
“though better adapted for general policy making than courts, [they] are both by size and
membership hampered in doing the legal engineering necessary to their purposes.”55 
Administrative agencies were a possibility; they offered “the means of developing experts
specialized in their field, of getting quick decisions and, above all, of getting a wealth of
detailed, specific rulings.”56  But bureaucracy, too, had its limitations.  “Administrative Poo-
bahisim–plaintiff, judge, hangman all in one–is not always happy.”57  Thus, Llewellyn
concluded, “it may be queried whether any sane public regulation of economic activity in the
public interest–whatever that may be–is not largely accidental.”  The best option for regulating
lop-sided bargains, therefore, lay with the groups themselves.58
          In the case of lop-sided standardized contracts between members of different groups,
both judicial and legislative intervention is
typical both in its incidents and in its limitations. Outsiders law can hold inequity
somewhat within bounds; but it has little machinery to effect a cure.  The more hopeful
movement is the meeting of organization with organization.  There were the conferences
between shippers, carriers, and bankers which led to the uniform railroad bill of lading. 
59Id. at 674.
60See Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note -- at 270-301.  Recently, Allen Kamp has published a series
of articles that give a fresh and more detailed perspective on the story.  Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought,
supra note —; Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code; 1940-49, 51 SMU L.
Rev. 275 (1998); Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note ---.  See also, Wiseman, The Limits of Vision, supra note —;
Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the Good, The True, The
Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 Geo L. J. 1141(1985); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism,
and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83 (1993);
Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note — .
61 See COMMITTEE ON COMMERCIAL LAW, REPORT, 10 ABA REP. 332-44 (1887); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr.,
Federalism or Uniformity in Commercial Law, 11 Rutgers-Camden L. J. 527 (1980).
62 Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30
Law & Contemp. Prob. 233 (1965).
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And even more important and extensive is the introduction of the balanced standardized
contract without official stimulus....The standardized contract with arbitration is thus a
shining engine of control for any highly specialized going concern within, and partly
independent of the greater going concern, the state.59
  In sum, the principle that evolved into Llewellyn’s doctrine of unconscionability was
specifically designed to permit courts to regulate lop-sided contracts by finding and then simply
applying group outrage at the excesses of the “chiseler.”  
. II.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARTICLE 2
A.  A Brief Overview of the Uniform Commercial Code Project
The story of the Uniform Commercial Code project and Llewellyn’s unique role in the
process has been told many times.60  The current that carried the Code project forward was the 
impetus for uniformity in commercial law.  The rise of the modern industrial state in the late
nineteenth century exposed the significant diversity that existed in the commercial law of
various states.  The resulting uncertainty and legal information costs led to proposals for the
enactment of a federal commercial code to govern interstate commercial transactions.61  These
proposals in turn stimulated the formation of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1892.62  Rather than accept federal intrusions on traditional
state authority , the National Conference proposed to formulate and seek adoption of various
uniform laws governing different aspects of commercial law.  Each state was then encouraged
to adopt these uniform statutes.  One of those uniform statutes was the Uniform Sales Act,
63 The Sales Act was modeled on the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, see Twining,  KARL LLEWELLYN,
supra note -- at 277.
64Ultimately, the Sales Act was adopted in 34 states.
65Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note -- at 276-78; See Karl Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales
Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558 (1940).
66Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note --- at 276-78.
67The marriage between the ALI and NCCUSL was proposed and arranged in the 1940's by William
Schnader, a prominent attorney who was a vice-president of the ALI and also served as President of NCCUSL. See
Patchel, supra note —at 98.   
68 William D. Hawkland, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Civil Code, 56 La. L. Rev. 23-25
(1995).
69 William Prosser was the principal reporter for Article 3 (Commercial Paper), Fairfax Leary followed
by Walter Malcolm were the reporters for Article 4 (Bank Collections) and Allison Dunham and Grant Gilmore
were the reporters for Article 9 (Secured Transactions).
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drafted by Samuel Williston and adopted by NCCUSL  in 1906.63 
The Sales Act was never an unqualified success.  It received a mixed reception in the
states, and initially was adopted in just over half the states.64  Moreover, Llewellyn was not
alone in criticizing some of its central features, most significantly its reliance on the concept of
title in the goods to determine risk of loss and other responsibilities arising out of the sales
transaction. The shortcomings with the Sales Act, and the impediments to its revision, led
Llewellyn to lobby for the introduction and passage of a Federal Sales Act.65  The National
Conference reacted to the threat of federalization with predictable speed.  The commissioners
lobbied against federal enactment, began drafting a revised sales act and, perhaps most
significantly, persuaded Karl Llewellyn to assume the principle revision responsibilities.66
By 1944, the NCCUSL had formed a collaboration with the American Law Institute
(ALI) and, working in tandem, they expanded the revised sales act project to include the
drafting of a comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code.67  The decision to produce a code was
primarily instrumental.  The ALI and NCCUSL believed that this consolidation of commercial
law into a single statutory scheme would enable them to sell the entire project to the states on a
“take it or leave it” basis thus avoiding the selective enactment that had occurred with earlier
uniform acts.68 While Llewellyn worked on the Code project for over ten years, responsibility
for drafting  key provisions dealing with credit instruments, bank collections and secured
transactions --Articles 3,4, and 9-- was assigned to others.69  In short order, the drafting process
of these articles came to be dominated by representatives of banking and commercial financing
70 Kamp, Downtown Code, supra note — at 382-388.; Gilmore, Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman,
supra note — at 619-626; Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note — at 638-645.   
71Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783, 1815-1845 (1994); Schwartz & Scott,
Political Economy, supra note— at 643-48.
72Twining, KARL LLEWELLYN, supra note — at 280-290.
73 Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note — at 155.  By 1975, Louisiana had enacted Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5. 
Subsequently, Article 9 and portions of Article 2 were enacted as well.
74 Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Little Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159, 168-170 
(1938); Karl Llewellyn, INTRODUCTION TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES at iv (1929) (“title is a wholly
unnecessary major premise”). Tellingly, Article 2 begins, in § 2-101 with an initial comment:
 The arrangement of the present article is in terms of contract for sale and the various steps of its
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interests.70  Articles 3,4, and 9 were, in the main, characterized by detailed, precise rules that
allocated commercial risks in ways favorable to the commercial interests that participated so
actively in the drafting process.  No doubt  the clarity of the new rules governing asset based
financing, credit instruments and payment systems  reduced transactions costs in the relevant
credit markets.  But, equally clearly, the rules favored the interests of sophisticated repeat
players in those markets  over those of occasional participants in financing transactions.71
 The Article 2 project, on the other hand, proceeded without the active participation of
external interest groups. The project was dominated by Llewellyn and his band of academic
reformers.72  The revisions that the academic reformers agreed to during the drafting process
were those that they felt were necessary to secure the approval of the far more conservative
lawyers and other legal professionals that dominated the two sponsoring  private legislative
bodies.  Once Article 2 passed the twin hurdles of approval by the ALI and NCCUSL, it was
essentially carried along by widespread industry support for the credit and financing articles. 
Although Pennsylvania adopted the Code in 1952, it was not until the comprehensive lobbying
following the New York Law Revision Commission analysis of the Code in 1956 that the
professional community joined forces to ensure the enactment of the Code in New York and
thereafter within a decade  in every other American state except Louisiana.73
B.  The Default Rules of Article 2.
Llewellyn had two principal objections to Willistonian formalism, as embodied (most
irritatingly, in his view) in the Sales Act.  First, he objected to those default rules that were
based on artificial doctrinal conceptions, such as the location of “title” in the goods.  These
defaults were “inefficient” in the sense that they did not reflect the terms of agreement that most
parties in the relevant trade would have made for themselves.74  Second, the Sales Act default
performance.  The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the contract and action taken
under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as being the
determining factor.  The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical men turn upon the
location of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute
for such abstractions proof of word and actions of a tangible character.  
75Karl Llewellyn, On Our Case Law of Offer and Acceptance I, 48 Yale L. J. 1, 12,28 (1938) (a
meaningful rule is one that is defined by “operative fact”; such rules are “understandable and clear about what the
action is which is to be guided and ....must state clearly how to deal with the raw facts as they arise...”) 
76As Llewellyn observed, under the Sales Act, title governed questions of  “risk of loss, action for the
price, the applicable law in an interstate transaction, the place and time for measuring damages, and the power to
defeat the other party’s interest, or to replevy , or to reject.”  Karl Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit
Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159, — (1938).  He went on to say that “this would be an admirable way to go at it if
the Title concept had been tailored to fit the normal course of a going or suspended situation during its flux or
suspension.  But Title was not thus conceived, nor has its environment of buyers and sellers had material effect
upon it.” Id.  See Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 Yale L. J.
129, 130-32.(1994).  
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rules applied in the main to all transactions equally and thus were insufficiently tailored to the
circumstances of particular trades and industries.75  Llewellyn’s effort to solve the first problem
by substituting more efficient defaults was, in general, a conspicuous success.  His attempt to
solve the second problem by creating a mechanism for the recognition and incorporation of
tailored, industry specific defaults was, in the end, a notable failure.  
1.  Regulating Contractual Breakdown:  Efficient Allocation of Commercial Risks. 
Since the focus  in recent years has turned to the deficiencies of Article 2, it is easy to neglect
its singular contribution: a series of efficient default terms for salvaging broken contracts that
reduced contracting costs for many (if not most) parties to sales transactions.  As noted in Part I,
Llewellyn was committed to the idea of filling contractual gaps with defaults that were ex ante
efficient; that is, defaults that reduced expected contracting costs and thus, presumably,
mimicked the arrangement most commercial  parties would have made for themselves.   Under
the Sales Act, most risk allocation questions were resolved by determining who had the title to
the contract goods.  The problem was, that while everyone knew that the party who had the title
assumed the relevant risk, no one knew who had the title.76  The resulting uncertainty increased
transactions costs and complicated efforts to contract out of the legal default.  Llewellyn’s risk
of loss rules illustrate his commitment to legal defaults that reduce transactions costs for
contracting parties.  Rather than using artificial conceptions of title, Article 2 assigns the risk of
loss in general to the party in control of the goods, on the (generally sound) intuition that the
party in control can best take precautions to reduce endogenous  risk and/or insure against
77 See UCC § 2-509.  Comment 1 to 2-509 states: “The underlying theory of these sections on risk of
loss is the adoption of the contractual approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of the risk with the ‘property in the
goods’.”  Comment 3 explains why a merchant seller bears the risk of loss until actual receipt by a buyer:  “The
underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues
meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to insure his interest in them.  The buyer, on the other hand
has no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance of goods not yet in his
possession.”
78 See UCC §§ 2-601 through 2-608.
79See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 230-311 (2d ed.
1991);  Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law, supra note – at --.
80 Section 11-A of the 1941 Revised Uniform Sales Act proposed to substitute the standard of mercantile
performance for the traditional sales law standard of perfect tender. See Report and Second Draft , THE REVISED
UNIFORM SALES ACT (1941) reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 269, 378-81  (Elizabeth S.
Kelly ed. 1984).  Under this test the buyer was required to accept performance where the risks and burdens on the
buyer were not materially increased and the goods met the “operating or marketing requirements of the buyer in
the course of his business.”
81For a discussion of the trade offs between a substantial performance standard and the perfect tender rule
, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual
Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967, 995-997,1009-1011 (1983).
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exogenous risks.77 A similar approach is reflected in the “salvage” rules of Article 2 --
rejection, cure, acceptance, and revocation of acceptance.78  These rules were also drafted with
the purpose of reducing contracting costs ex ante by encouraging ex post adjustments by the
party with the comparative advantage in mitigating the costs of broken contracts.79
Llewellyn was particularly sensitive to the costs of strategic behavior in the
performance of sales contracts. He initially proposed to substitute a substantial performance
standard in place of the traditional perfect tender rule on the grounds that it was the more
efficient default rule for sales contracts in which the seller’s investment in the transaction
exposed it to the risk of opportunism by the buyer.80  Llewellyn understood, however, that a
substantial performance rule operated as a double edged sword. Requiring a buyer to accept
goods that “substantially conformed” to the contract reduces the risk of strategic rejections by
the buyer, but, in turn, it exposes the buyer to an opportunistic tender by the seller of
substandard goods.81  His solution to this dilemma reflects his understanding that legal defaults
that impose flexible adjustment on one party become opportunities for exploitation by the other. 
The answer, in his view, lay in the practices and norms of the particular trade and industry. 
These norms presumably would have evolved with sufficient fact-specificity to screen
legitimate requests for adjustment from strategic ones.  To solve this conundrum, therefore,
Llewellyn proposed the establishment of a merchant tribunal–a specialized fact finder that
82 The comment to the 1941 Draft, section 11-A states: “The proposed policy presupposes the availability
of a skilled and specialized mercantile tribunal to pass on the question of fact  in case of dispute.  Section 59. 
There is no question of incurring the uncertainty which would be involved by letting such a matter go in first
instance to an ordinary jury.”  Section 59-C(I) provided that the merchant experts were to sit with a court “not as
party representatives, but as a special sworn expert tribunal to find the true facts.”
83 The 1944 draft of the Uniform Revised Sales Act abandoned both the substantial performance standard
for rejection of goods as well as the merchants tribunal.  See UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, sec. 91 (Proposed
Final Draft 1944), reprinted in 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRAFTS ( Elizabeth Kelly ed. 1984).  The substantial
performance standard was objected to by merchants themselves, who felt that it would expose them to the risk of
sellers tendering non-conforming goods.  See George Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of
Nonconforming Goods Under the UCC: An Economic Approach, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 960, 971 n. 27b (1975).  The
merchants tribunal was seen as unworkable, and politically unfeasible. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, FIFTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE at 131 (1942).  
84 See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note – at 997-1000 ( “to invoke [the cure
provision] properly, one must imagine a case in which a tender is clearly defective, but the seller nonetheless
anticipates that the buyer will accept the tender as a legitimate readjustment option.  These requirements are
satisfied where one can evaluate the deficiency on the market and correct it with a monetary payment
accompanying the tender...Granting a seller the right to cure under appropriate conditions serves two functions. 
First, section 2-508(2) encourages a buyer anticipating special losses from non performance to bargain for
additional protection at the time of contracting.... Second, and perhaps more importantly, the cure provision
restrains opportunistic claims by the buyer.  Unfortunately, it also invites evasion by the seller through the tender
of inadequate substitutes as a ‘cure’.”)  
85 The efficient breach hypothesis --which holds that breach enables the promisor to take advantage of a
better market opportunity while guaranteeing the promisee the value of its bargain-- fails to explain breach in
markets where substitute goods are available.  In such a case, the promisor can always “perform” the contract by
covering on the market from a third party and tendering the substitute “performance” in satisfaction of the
contract, thereby freeing the promisor to purse any alternative market opportunity without having to suffer the
reputational consequences of breaching a contract.  Thus the question: in a market where goods are available in
substitution for the contract, what explains why any party would advertently breach?  See Scott & Kraus,
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would measure each party’s performance and its responses to the other’s performance against
established industry norms.82 The merchant jury was too radical a proposal, however, and was
soon abandoned in the face of objections from more conservative members of the private
legislatures.83  In the end, Llewellyn returned to the perfect tender rule but, by incorporating a
cure provision, was able to create a structure for mutual adjustment that accomplishes many of
the same purposes as a substantial performance rule.84
A final example of efficient defaults for broken contracts is the remedial scheme
introduced in Article 2.  Llewellyn began by focusing on the central question of all disputed
contracts: which party is responsible for salvaging the broken contract?  This question, in turn,
requires one to answer a deeper one: given a default rule of expectation damages equal to the
value of the broken contract to the promisee, why would anyone ever breach (except
inadvertently)? 85  And yet, we observe advertent breach.  There are two possible explanations
CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, supra note – at 822-26.
86 The assumption here is that the promisor  recognizes that it will suffer a loss on the contract and wishes
to enlist the promisee’s assistance in minimizing that loss.  The decision to breach, on this view, is made after
comparing the promisor’s costs of acting on the market with the (presumably lower) salvage costs of the promisee 
   (for example, a breaching seller presumably would incur greater costs in finding a substitute seller from whom to
purchase conforming goods to tender to the buyer than would the buyer, who knows better the market for the
goods that it requires).
87The Code’s remedial scheme implicitly adopts an initial  presumption that breach is a cry for help. 
Thus, specific performance (or an action for the price) is an extraordinary remedy. (See §§2-703, 2-711). The
promisee buyer has an option of either covering on the market (§2-712) or establishing what a cover contract
would have cost (§2-713).  But, in either case, as long as there is a market for the goods, the buyer is presumed to
have the comparative advantage in salvaging the broken contract and must act on the market and subsequently
submit a damage claim to the seller.  The same presumption holds for the promisee seller, who must initially
choose between resale (§2-706) or proof of what a resale would have yielded on the market (§2-708(1)).  In either
case, only when the promisee can show that the market for substitutes is thin does the Code presumption shift
toward the malign story.  In such a case, the promisee buyer can secure specific performance (§2-716, comment 2:
“inability to cover is ‘other proper circumstances’”), and the promisee seller can recover the price (§2-709(1)b):
“unable after reasonable effort to resell”).
88See UCC §§2-716, 2-709(1)(b). The argument is that, in a thin market, a promisee is unlikely to enjoy a
comparative advantage over the promisor  in covering on the market while, at the same time, the promisee is more
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for a promisor’s decision to breach in the face of an expectation damages rule.  The first is
benign: the decision to breach is a “cry for help”-- a request that the contracting partner adjust
to the broken contract by covering (or reselling) on the market and submitting a “damages” bill
to the promisor.86  The alternative explanation is strategic: breach is motivated by the
imperfections in the judicial system that systematically deny the promisee his contractual
expectancy.  Promisors who breach, under this conception, are able to exploit these
imperfections to secure a favorable settlement of the disputed transaction.  The challenge for
contract theory is to predict when the benign scenario is more likely than the malign one (and
vice versa).  If the benign story is the more probable explanation for the promisor’s breach, an
efficient default rule would direct courts to award only a damages remedy to the promisee, thus
encouraging the promisee to respond to the cry for help by acting appropriately on the market.  
On the other hand, if the malign scenario is the more probable in the particular case, the rule
should direct the court to grant specific relief to the promisee, thus trumping the (presumptively)
strategic request for assistance. 
Under the Article 2 scheme, the determination of which of these explanations is more
likely in any particular setting turns on the nature of the market for substitute goods.87  Where the
market is thin, the implicit assumption is that breach is more likely to be strategic and the
promisee can trump the “cry for help” by demanding either specific performance or the contract
price (as the case may be).88  Where there is an available market for the contract goods,
vulnerable to strategic claims that the cover contract was unreasonable since market prices are more difficult to
prove. Scott & Kraus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY, supra note --at--.
89Scott, The Case for Market Damages, supra note — at 188-1201.
90 The most successful contract formation defaults in Article 2 are 1) the presumption that parties care
more about the fact of assent than the manner in which assent is given (§2-204(1)), and  2) cost minimizing rules
for dealing with open price and quantity contracts, see §§2-305 and 2-306. See Robert E. Scott & Charles J. Goetz,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089, 111-1126 (1981).  But see Victor P. Goldberg,
Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 319 (2002)
(arguing that the search for  “good faith” in interpreting open quantity contracts often supplants the parties actual
agreement with a “wooden, uninformed reading of the agreement”).
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however, the promisee is limited to market damages.  This motivates the promisee to adjust
efficiently to the broken contract by salvaging the broken contract on the market, either by resale
or by cover (or, in the alternative, relying on proof of what such an action on the
 market would have yielded).89  
The success of Article 2 in substituting efficient defaults that encourage cost minimizing
efforts to salvage broken contracts  should not be underestimated. While the people for whom
Llewellyn was drafting were not sophisticated theorists, they were sophisticated commercial
lawyers who were well aware of the inefficiencies embedded in the Sales Act. In drafting these
provisions of the Code, as well as a set of efficient defaults that reduced contract  formation
costs,90 Llewellyn relied upon his long career as a commercial lawyer. Tearing down the “wall”
of title and drafting sophisticated schemes to facilitate the salvaging of disputed contracts was
seen then, as it is now, as a major improvement in the legal regime, one that would likely ensure
the support of the ALI and NCCUSL members whose approval was necessary for the Code
project to succeed. 
2.  Regulating Ongoing Contractual Relationships: Flexibility and Tailored Defaults.
 Llewellyn’s solution for regulating on-going contractual relationships was even more creative
and ambitious than his scheme for regulating broken contracts.  While the economic analysis of
relational contracts was not available to him (and neither were developments in game theory and
decision making under conditions of imperfect information), he had an intuitive sense that
ongoing contractual relationships were not efficiently regulated by binary default rules that
allocated risks on an “all or nothing” basis.  Relational contracts are more difficult for the law to
address because, in these environments, the parties are confronted with problems of uncertainty
and complexity that effectively prevent them, even in theory, from allocating all relevant risks at
the time of contracting.  Parties in these situations write incomplete contracts either because the
transactions costs of predicting the future are prohibitive or because they are trying to cope with
91 Alan Schwartz,  Incomplete Contracts, 2 NEW PALGRAVE  DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW  277
(1997);  Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note — at 862-866.
92See Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 555 (1963).
93  UCC §2-202, comment 1,2 (1995) (“This section definitely rejects...the requirement that a condition
precedent to the admissibility of [evidence of course of dealing, usage of trade or course of performance] is an
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problems of asymmetric information.91 
While Llewellyn did not have the conceptual tools to address this problem at the level of
theory, he did have the advantage of twenty years as a commercial lawyer and a close observer
of the behavior of commercial actors in particular trades and markets. What Llewellyn saw was
similar to the findings of Stuart Macaulay a generation later.92  Parties adjusted voluntarily to
changed circumstances during the life of the contract.  If an exogenous shock delayed the delivery
of goods in a particular industry, the buyer would accept the late delivery and look for a price
discount on a subsequent transaction.  Not only were these patterns of flexible adjustment
ubiquitous, but Llewellyn saw as well that the parties coped with moral hazard problems in
much the same way: strong social norms in the form of trade practice or even contract-specific
patterns of interaction developed to police opportunism on both sides of the transaction.  
The solution to the dilemma of relational contracting seemed straightforward.  Rather
than impose abstract and general rules to regulate ongoing relationships, the law should simply
identify and incorporate the “working rules” already being used successfully by the parties
themselves.  These working rules (or “by-laws” as Llewellyn also called them) needed the
imprimatur of the state for two reasons.  First, the primary culprit in the depressed economic
times of the period was thought to be the contract-dodger or chiseler who would violate the
norms, sell shoddy goods (or fail to pay for conforming ones) and thus set off a spiraling race to
the bottom.  Moreover, the “jurisdiction” of the “working rules” was uncertain because they
arose from custom and practice.  Legal incorporation was necessary, therefore, in order to
resolve “trouble” cases where the relevant norms were in dispute.
Llewellyn addressed the incorporation objective by reversing the common law
presumption that the parties writings and the official majoritarian default rules (the law of
contract) are the definitive elements of the agreement.  Rather, Article 2 explicitly invites
incorporation by defining the content of an agreement to include trade usage, prior dealings and
the parties experiences in forming the contract. The parol evidence rule under the Code admits
inferences from trade usage even if the express terms of the contract seem perfectly clear and are
apparently “integrated.”93  The invitation to contextualize the contract in this manner is explicitly
original determination by the court that the language used is ambiguous. [Section 2-202] makes admissible
evidence of course of dealing,, usage of trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of
any writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true understanding of the parties...may be
reached.”).  See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 273-280 (1985).
94UCC §1-201(3) defines “agreement” as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or
by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance
as provided in this Act.”  
95 UCC §1-205(3) (1995).  Comment 1 to §1-205 provides that: “the meaning of the agreement is to be
determined by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial
practices and other surrounding circumstances.  The measure and background for interpretation are set by the
commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.”
96 REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT, 1941 DRAFT § 59-D(1) “the special finding of the merchant experts
shall be received in evidence, and shall be sufficient to sustain the evidence.”  In addition to the issue of substantial
performance, the merchants tribunal was competent to opine on the effect of any mercantile usage on the terms of
a contract, the mercantile reasonableness of any action by either party and “any other issue which requires for its
competent determination special merchants knowledge rather than general knowledge.” See REVISED UNIFORM
SALES ACT, § 59(1), (C)(D).
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embodied in the Code’s definition of agreement,94 and it is amplified in section 1-205 which
specifies that course of dealing and usages of trade give particular meaning to, and qualify terms
of, an agreement.95
It is important to emphasize that Llewellyn did not embrace commercial context as a
method of filling gaps from an ex post perspective.  He was not concerned with a subjective
determination of what the particular parties “really meant” by their agreement.  Rather, as a
committed devotee of ex ante default rules, his purpose was to incorporate rules that would
encourage efficient ex ante contracting.  Unfortunately, this  point  was completely lost on those
who subsequently wrote about and interpreted Llewellyn’s statutory scheme.  Since Llewellyn’s
purpose was to incorporate flexible and tailored defaults, he required a mechanism by which
these local norms could be identified by courts.  That mechanism was the merchant tribunal. 
Linked originally to his effort to substitute substantial performance in place of perfect tender, the
merchant jury was a panel of experts that would find specific facts–such as whether the behavior
of a contracting party was “commercially reasonable.” To avoid questions of constitutionality,
Llewellyn proposed to retain the lay jury as the final arbiter of the facts, informed by the
merchant tribunal’s judgment about the relevant commercial working rules that applied to the
particular dispute.96   
 The idea of the merchant tribunal was entirely too radical for the commercial lawyers
who dominated the ALI and the drafting process.  By 1944, Llewellyn had abandoned this key
97 Jim Whitman has noted that the abandonment of the merchants tribunal was not accompanied by a
similar jettisoning of the many issues that the tribunal was to decide:
But when the commissioners abandoned Section 59, they did not abandon a host of provisions that
assumed the institutional framework of Section 59.  Llewellyn’s Code retained its deference to “custom”,
the “law merchant”, good faith” and “reasonableness”.  In Llewellyn’s romantic vocabulary, however,
“custom” the “law merchant’, “good faith” and “reasonableness” were not terms of substantive law, but
were procedural directives, indications to a court that it should refer its decision to lay specialists with a
feel for commercial law.
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 Yale L. J. 156, 174 (1987).  Thus, while the idea behind the provisions on
commercial reasonableness was that the merchant juries would, over time, develop default rules defining
“reasonable” behavior in particular contexts, the absence of these juries has caused courts to rely on intuition .  As
a result, the  norm of reasonableness has become a major source of non-uniformity in the application of the Code. 
Id. At 175.  See also, Scott, The Uniformity Norm at 185 n. 68 (in the overwhelming majority of sampled case,
courts did not attempt to examine  evidence of the actual commercial context to determine commercially
reasonable behavior.  Rather, they viewed the commercial reasonableness question as requiring an deductive
evaluation based on Code principles or other intuitions about reasonable behavior).
98 See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General
Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J. Law Econ. & Org. 199, 203 (1988) (“Although writing down binding contract
terms may...reduce the probability of being outside the self-enforcing range [of social and relational norms], the
rigidity of long term contract terms may create a much larger hold-up potential if events actually place the parties
outside the self-enforcing range.  To avoid this rigidity transactors may intentionally leave their contracts
incomplete and thereby give themselves “an out” if market conditions “get out of hand”).
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device for discovering the relevant social norms, while still retaining the architecture of
incorporation, including the  injunction that  parties conform their behavior to the supereminent
norm of commercial reasonableness.  Viewed in retrospect, eliminating the merchant jury while
retaining the pervasive notion of commercial reasonableness was a drafting disaster.97 
But the failure to provide for the merchant jury is but a symptom of a larger
jurisprudential mistake for which Llewellyn must be held at least partly responsible.  Llewellyn
believed that custom and usages–the by-laws of commercial practice-- were indistinguishable
from legal rules.  Thus, when a court incorporated a relevant norm as the rule of decision in a
contract dispute, this action would not, he assumed, change either the character or the utility of 
the norm itself.   To the contrary, there is growing evidence that social norms and legal rules,
while both complements and substitutes, operate in different domains.  These differences support
the preferences of many contracting parties to be governed under separate regimes of bright-line
legal default rules and flexible relational norms that are not legally enforceable.
 There are several reasons why parties may wish to maintain the distinction between
legal rules, enforceable by a third party, and self-enforcing social or relational norms.  One
important reason is that by explicitly writing flexibility into the contract as a legal rule the
parties may  actually increase the risk of opportunism in the relationship.98  Given the error costs
99 Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle, supra note —at 982-84.
100 Scott, Relational Theory, supra note —at  613-15; Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996) (same);
Omri Ben-Sharar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781 (1999)
(arguing that incorporating flexible adjustments as legal rules increases enforcement costs to promisees).
101Schwartz, Origins of Contract Theory, supra note --at 22-23.
102 Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society II, supra note -- at 381. See Twining, KARL
LLEWELLYN, supra note —at 310-313.
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of third-party enforcement, flexible legal standards are subject to opportunistic exploitation by
the promisor.  In other words, any default rule that makes the promisee’s duty to cooperate a
condition of the promisor’s duty to perform will inevitably invite both cooperative responses
from the promisee  and opportunistic behavior from the promisor.  For example, a promisor may
be tempted to claim that the promisee’s efforts to cooperate are inadequate thus justifying a
suspension of the return performance.99   Since each party is both a promisee and a promisor,
they have reciprocal motivations to avoid writing contracts with terms that increase contracting
costs. It may be, therefore, that the lesson Llewellyn failed to learn is that contracting parties
have learned to live under two sets of rules; a stricter set of legally  enforceable rules and a
more flexible set of self-enforcing relational norms.  Any effort to judicialize these social and
relational norms threatens to destroy the very informality and flexibility  that makes them so
effective in the first instance.100 
3.  Rule Form and Structure in Article 2.  Many observers have noted the striking
differences in the rule form between Article 2 and the other substantive articles of the Code. 
Article 2 contains a large number of open-ended, vague admonitions and “muddy” rules.  Many
sections are little more than statements of principle that delegate broad discretion to courts to
apply them to specific circumstances. The vague rules of Article 2 stand in sharp contrast to
Llewellyn’s frequently expressed preference for precise, bright line rules in commercial law.101  
 There are several obvious explanations for the many vague rules of Article 2.  First,
Llewellyn believed that codes differed from ordinary statutes in their resistence to amendment. 
A good code, therefore, facilitates “judicial development (not mere interpretation)” by stating
broad principles and directing courts to reason from them by analogy.102  Second, Article 2
applies to a wide range of contexts and parties.  The greater the heterogeneity of the parties and
the greater the variety of contexts to which a particular rule applies, the more convenient it is for
103 In short, it is less costly for the drafter of a broadly applicable statute to instruct parties to behave
“reasonably” than to draft clear, sensible rules for a large number of contexts.  Schwartz & Scott, Political
Economy supra note — at 618. 
104Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note – at 615-21.
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a lawmaker to draft rules that are more open-ended and abstract.103  But even beyond the number
of vague rules that one would expect to find in such a broadly applicable statute, the rule form of
Article 2 is a product of the political economy of its enactment.  Article 2 was a “reformer
dominated” process, one that was characterized by the virtual absence of pressure from external
interest groups.  The lack of interest group influence in shaping Article 2 default rules is easy to
understand.  Unlike, for example,  the rules that govern classes of secured and unsecured
creditors in Article 9, sales law applies equally to commercial buyers and sellers.  Since
contracting parties may at any point in time occupy either role, the new default rules of sales law 
did not excite the attention of defined interest groups of sellers or buyers. 
The major influence on rule form in such circumstances is the tension between the
interest of the dominant academic reformers (in this case, Llewellyn and his cohort) in securing
the adoption of the reform proposals, on the one hand, and the normative values reflected in the
proposals themselves, on the other.   Under these conditions, the Schwartz/Scott model of private
legislatures predicts that the private legislature will adopt reform proposals that contain many
vague and muddy rules.  These rules will result, not solely from their intrinsic merits, but from
the compromises that reformer-dominated groups will accept in order to secure enactment.104   In
this way, Llewellyn’s abandonment of the merchant tribunal left his notions of commercial
reasonableness without an anchor.  Consider, for example,  section 2-609.  It  provides that
“when reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the
other may in writing demand adequate assurances of due performance and until he receives such
assurances may if commercially reasonable suspend his own performance....(emphasis added)” 
Generations of law students have begun their study of the Code by confronting the facially
vacuous nature of that default rule.  Without a careful identification and incorporation of the
relevant commercial context, the provision offers little in the way of a standardized risk
allocation since it has little predictable meaning.  For these and other reasons,  the project of
crafting flexible, tailored default rules failed in the implementation.  But the vacuous nature of
the provisions that invite incorporation nonetheless generated little opposition from the ALI and
NCCUSL membership whose approval was critical to the enactment of the Code.  
C.  Article 2 and Freedom of Contract.
Llewellyn’s views on freedom of contract were reflected in the early drafts of Article 2. 
His concern with “unbalanced” transactions prompted the creation of an obligation of good faith
105UCC §2-103(1)(b).
106See REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT, 1941 DRAFT §§ 15(2)(6).
107Id. at § 16-B.
108UCC §2-316(2),(3)(a),(c).
109UCC § 2-318 (Alternative A).
110 UCC § 1-102(3) provides that “the effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement except
as otherwise provided in this Act...”  Comment 3 states that “subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that
freedom of contract is a principle of the Code...”
111See, e.g., UCC §§ 1-103, 2-721.
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that, for merchants, imposes a duty to observe reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade.105 
While he viewed standard form contracting as an efficient adaptation to a modern, mass
production economy, he created the doctrine of unconscionability to encourage group policing
(under judicial direction) of lop-sided contract terms.  In addition, the initial drafts reflected
Llewellyn’s earlier, specific concerns with freedom of contract in allocating the risks of
defective products.   The early drafts imposed nonwaivable risks of product defects on sellers
based either on their status as  merchants, their specialized knowledge of the buyer’s needs, or
on implied guarantees inferred from the process of describing the goods and/or their attributes.106
This expanded warranty liability was, in turn, extended to remote sellers regardless of the
absence of privity of contract.107 
None of the proposals to further narrow the domain of free contract through mandatory
(or “iron”)  rules survived the drafting process.  Implied warranties were expressly made
disclaimable, either by the incorporation of custom or by the invocation of conspicuous “magic
words.”108 Warranty actions by disappointed buyers were generally limited to those sellers in
privity of contract with the plaintiff.109  Finally, in  significant places throughout the article –
most notably in the Code’s statement of normative purposes – the final drafts affirmed the
principle of freedom of contract (and the concomitant right to contract out) as a fundamental
norm of Article 2.110   To be sure, Article 2 retains the traditional, common law limits on
bargaining.111  Formal rules, such as the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule, are
mandatory as are those provisions that incorporate traditional common law prohibitions on fraud
and duress.  But, viewed against the backdrop of the fundamental changes in the nature and form
of sales law default rules,  the statute is remarkably muted in its response to the problems of
mass market, standardized contracting.
112  See Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions, supra note -- at 671; Llewellyn, What Price Contract,
supra note –  at 731.  
113Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note – at 704.
114  Id. at 704.
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        While this was the effect, it was not the intent.  Llewellyn conceived of the
unconscionability provision as the key method of policing unfair and unbalanced transactions. 
He wanted courts to undertake a two step process to identify those contracts that unconscionably
violated group norms.  The first step, now commonly denoted procedural unconscionability, is
present when one party to the transaction has market power or when one side is more
sophisticated or knowledgeable than the other.112   While he understood the value of competition
in protecting buyers from unfair terms, Llewellyn believed that the race to the bottom stimulated
by the “chiseler” would ultimately degrade even competitive markets. Thus, he saw the use of
similar terms by all firms in a market as strong evidence of market failure. This prima facie
evidence of procedural defects in the transactions would then justify asking whether the
transaction was substantively unconscionable. 
         In Llewellyn’s view, a transaction is substantively unconscionable if it is “unbalanced” or
“lop-sided.” A lop-sided contract imposes too many risks on one party. The key test of balance
was the set of default terms (“yielding rules”) that the law has developed over many years. 
“Bodies of yielding rules have grown some balance in their allocation of risks and rights.”113 
Thus, too much contracting out in transactions that were procedurally deficient rendered the
transaction unbalanced. But this commitment to policing parties who contract out seems
inconsistent with Llewellyn’s other commitment to the specification of useful default rules that
parties could accept or not at their option.  Llewellyn’s answer to this tension was instructive: “
The policy of leaving yielding rules free to change by individuated bargain does not involve a
commitment to a policy of allowing displacement of the whole set of yielding rules at once, and
without individuation....There must be a decent balance in the frame of contracting which is to
hold for all points not individuated by the parties.”114  
          But how to determine how much contracting out is “too much?”  Once again, the answer to
this question could come only from the commercial context.  The merchant group itself had an
interest in policing the “contract-dodger” and they knew when a transaction was
“unconscionably unbalanced.”  Thus, the merchant tribunal (or some reasonable substitute
method of identifying group norms) was an essential component in the scheme to harmonize the
commitment to incorporating ex ante default rules with the commitment to policing unfair
bargains. As famously noted by Arthur Leff, the unconscionability doctrine, once removed from
115 Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code–The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485
(1967).
116 See UCC §2-719(1)(a),(3). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the unconsionability provision did not
excite the opposition of merchants, either individually or collectively.  This was especially true once Llewellyn’s
drafting ally, the commercial lawyer, Hiram Thomas, persuaded him that the § 2-302 standard for intervention
should not be simply “unreasonable” terms but rather should be limited to those instances that truly “shocked the
conscience.”  Kamp, Uptown Act, supra note — at 306-07.
117 Kamp,  Between-The Wars Social Thought, supra note — at  392-93.
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its anchor in actual commercial practices, was facially vacuous.115  Indeed, the only prima facie
application of unconscionability that survived–the ban on consequential damages for personal
injuries in the case of consumer goods– served to highlight the freedom to reallocate non-
personal injury risks through standard repair and replacement clauses.116 
In short, Llewellyn’s Article 2, once it emerged from the private legislative process, was
entirely congenial to the commercial interests whose eyes were fixed firmly on the prizes
contained in Articles 3,4 and 9.  Some of the drafting compromises--for example, the decision to
abandon the mandatory assignment of defective product risks to sellers -- were no doubt
prompted by Llewellyn’s instinct to avoid concrete, bright-line rules that might jeopardize
Article 2's approval by the more conservative members of the ALI and NCCUSL.  On this view,
it is not surprising that the  vague unconscionability standard was the only surviving mechanism
for regulating standard form contracting.  But equally important to the political economy of the
enactment process was the fact that Llewellyn was a product of his time.  Our contemporary
focus on protecting individual consumer interests through aggressive judicial policing of
contracting behavior was simply inconsistent with his world-view.  Llewellyn’s view of the
proper domain of free contract reflects the collectivist world-view that he shared
 with the other institutionalists.  The regulatory structure of Article 2 is not designed to protect
one class (consumers) against another (producers) because Llewellyn simply did not think in
those terms.  The doctrine of unconscionability was designed to assist working groups engaged
in commerce to police the “chiselers” in their midst by testifying to the shocking nature of the
terms used in lop-sided contracts. In sum, Llewellyn’s regulatory scheme for Article 2 was to
empower merchants collectively rather than to empower consumers individually.117 
D.  Summary.
The dramatic success of the Code project following its approval by the ALI and
NCCUSL in 1951 is a thoroughly familiar story.  Pennsylvania adopted the Code in 1952 but no
states followed suit until the New York Law Revision Report in 1956 prompted changes
118 See Steven D. Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 671 (1999);
Michael Klausner, Corporation, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 786-89 (1995).
119Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 367, 369 (1957).
120 Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note – at 167-69.
37
(principally in  Articles 3 through 9) that responded to concerns of the commercial interests
whose support was critical to adoption by the states.  Thereafter, success was rapid.  By 1967,
every state except Louisiana had adopted the Code and, at least in a formal sense, uniformity in
commercial law had been achieved. 
  Karl Llewellyn’s active role in Article 2 and the Code project ended in the early
1950's, but his achievement in rescuing the default rules of sales law from the artificialities of
the Sales Act was immediately apparent.  There were (and are) measurable efficiency gains that
inhere in a uniform scheme of ex ante efficient default rules.  Prime among these are the
reduction in “learning effects”(the costs involved in learning about how best to use and deploy
novel terms) that result from a common legal language and method of categorization of legal
rules.118  This notion of a uniform “filing system” that permits the storage and retrieval of key
information was one of the strongest justifications offered by Llewellyn in the 1950's for the
adoption of a uniform sales law.119  As courts began to decide cases under the Code throughout
the latter half of the century, specific court decisions were filed under the broad rubric of Code-
defined categories such as rejection, cure, revocation of acceptance, etc.  This systematizing of
the retrieval of legal rules reduced the information costs imposed by the jurisdictional diversity
that governed the pre-Code era.
But despite the Code’s initial comparative advantage, a similar movement toward
interjurisdictional uniformity evolved in the common law over the same period. Indeed, the past
fifty years have witnessed a remarkable degree of harmonization of American commercial
common law.  The variations in contract law from state to state today are relatively small and
insignificant.  The result outside the Code over the same period of time, therefore, has been
substantive harmony without uniformity.120  Thus, in one sense, the benefits of Article 2 have
now been internalized in the common law process, exposing the deficiencies inherent in the
statute.  Those deficiencies, in  the end, may have contributed to the decision by  many
commercial parties  to abandon Article 2 and its open-ended default rules in favor of more
concrete, privately devised alternatives.  At the same time, the debate over freedom of contract,
especially in the regulation of standardized contracting, has intensified.  Whether these two
forces are primary causal factors in the decline of the Code’s relevance and the ultimate failure
of the revision process remains an open question.  But it seems hard to deny that they are salient
121 The Code’s defenders far out number its critics, even among those who are dismayed by the failure of
the current revision process.  The comments of Professor Melvin Eisenberg in the ALI members web site forum
sum up this majority view: “I should add that if the result [of the current deadlock] is no revision of Article 2, that’s
not the worst thing in the world.  Article 2 works well now, and whatever serious drafting flaws it had have by and
large been fixed up by the courts.  Of course a minor tuneup would probably be desirable, but it’s not imperative,
and very little will be lost by sticking with Article 2 as it stands.” Posting of Melvin Eisenberg 10/19/01
122  UCC §2-102 provides that “this Article applies to transactions in goods.”  Goods, in turn, are defined
in §1-104 as “all things movable at the time of identification to the contract.”  Thus, Article 2 by its terms declines
to resolve the issue of  jurisdiction over “mixed” transactions, such as transactions involving both a sale of goods
and the provision of services.  Many courts have settled on two tests to provide more clarity to scope disputes. 
The “divisibility” test asks whether the transaction can be separated into its goods and non-goods components.  If
so, then Article 2 applies to the portion of the contract dealing with goods and other relevant state law (typically
the common law of contracts) applies to the non goods components.  Where the goods portion of a transaction
cannot be separated functionally, most courts apply a “predominant feature” test that asks which component of the
mixed transaction–goods or non-goods–predominates. The predominant component determines which legal
regime applies. See e.g., Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Co. v. Martin Steel Corp., 398 NW 2d 553 (
Minn 1987); but see Elkins Manor Assoc. v. Eleanor Concrete Works, Inc. 396 S.E. 2d 463 (WVa 1990)
(declining to use the predominant feature test because the “test is too subjective to provide any basis for rational
analysis”).
 The original scope provision was unchanged in the version of the 2001 Amendments to Article 2 that was
adopted by the ALI membership in May, 2001.  All attempts to draft a clearer and more definitive scope provision
that drew lines between the coverage of Article 2 and the coverage of other law dealing with information and
software transactions fell victim to  interest group competition.  Lobbying by the representatives of the software
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contributing factors in explaining the dramatically different environment that surrounds the
private legislative process today.  
III.  ARTICLE 2 FIFTY YEARS LATER 
A.  The Article 2 Revision Process.
Article 2 needs revision.  This uncontested fact has been self-evident for two decades.
This is not to say that Article 2 has functioned inadequately as a framework for cataloguing
judicial decisions in sales contract disputes. Indeed, a number of contemporary scholars believe
that the statute has performed well in directing courts how best to fill the gaps in incomplete
contracts and to police unconscionable bargains.121  But whatever one’s views on these
questions, it is clear that the information revolution threatens to leave Article 2 in an increasingly
small backwater of commercial transactions.  If the statute is to retain its primacy as a source of
legal defaults that both facilitate and regulate commercial sales transactions, it must be adapted
to technological and economic developments that have created entirely new markets in
information technology.  The original scope provision of Article 2–covering all transactions in
goods–seems inadequate, even with its subsequent common law gloss, to answer fundamental
jurisdictional questions.122   Does or should Article 2 govern information contracting?  If not,
and information industries was successful in persuading the Article 2 drafting committee at the NCCUSL annual
meeting on August 13, 2001 to change its position and recommend a new scope provision negotiated and drafted
that day.  As noted above, the new provision survived a motion to delete, but a motion necessary to obtain NCCUSL
approval of the entire package failed.
123 Speidel, View from the Trenches, supra note – at  612-13. 
124 The subsequently disclosed terms typically have provisions by which sellers or licensors seek to limit
their warranty liability and/or limit the buyer/licensee’s remedies for “bugs” or defects in software or other
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what is the domain of Article 2 as distinct from the domain of alternative statutory or common
law rules governing software licensing transactions? 
In 1987, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code set out to
resolve these and other  questions under the auspices of a study committee.  The study committee
concluded that Article 2 was not an adequate legal framework for addressing the many unique
issues raised by software licensing transactions.  In 1991, acting upon the report and
recommendation of the study committee, the ALI and NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to
begin work on a comprehensive revision of Article 2, that, among other things, would bring
within the scope of Article 2 the provisions on lease transactions that were then embodied in
Article 2A, and would also include provisions to address the unique characteristics of software
licensing transactions. The Article 2 Drafting Committee worked for several years on this “hub
and spoke” scheme for incorporating all relevant transactions within the Article 2 umbrella.  But
the effort was abandoned when key insiders concluded that the differences between the products,
their markets and practices made the draft unworkable.123   The ALI and NCCUSL then decided
to return leases to its own statute (Article 2A) and also to draft a separate UCC Article 2B for
computer information contracts.  Separate drafting committees were thus appointed for each of
Article 2, Article 2A and Article 2B and the drafting work proceeded on parallel, but separate,
tracks. 
          The first public indication that the private legislative coalition that had supported the UCC
project for fifty years was beginning to unravel surfaced in 1999 when proposed Article 2B was
brought forward by the drafting committee for final approval by the ALI and NCCUSL.  The ALI
declined to approve Article 2B on the ground that the drafting process, dominated by the
software and information industry, had produced a “seller-friendly” statute.  NCCUSL, on the
other hand,  decided to go forward with the project on its own,  reissuing the statute as the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).   The controversy over UCITA
centers on the provisions of the statute dealing with contract formation in standardized retail
transactions.  UCITA endorses current market practices in which consumers signify advance
acceptance of  subsequently disclosed terms.124 Subsequently, UCITA has been adopted in
“smart” goods.  Thus, at bottom, the issue has to do with the extension of Article 2 warranty liability to software
and computer information providers and the mechanisms by which that liability can be shifted (in whole or in part).
See Jean Braucher, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA): Objections from the Consumer
Perspective, 5 No. 6 GLCY Law 2 (2000); James C. McKay. Jr., UCITA and the Consumer: A Response to
Professor Braucher, 5 No. 8 GLCY Law 9 (2000); Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly,
18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 547 (1999).
125 In an effort to respond to some of these concerns, the NCCUSL Standby  Committee issued a report in
December 2001 detailing recommendations concerning  proposed amendments to UCITA that it planned to make
to NCCUSL at its summer 2002 meeting.  On January 30, 2002 an ABA Working Group appointed by the ABA
Board of Governors filed a report on UCITA, concluding that it would be desirable to have a uniform law that set
forth legal rules governing licensing in computer transactions.   But the working group also raised a number of
critical concerns both with the alleged lack of clarity of UCITA’s terms and with the policy judgments implicit in
specific provisions, particularly those  governing scope and contract formation in retail transactions. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION WORKING GROUP REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS ACT, January 31, 2002.  According to the dissenting member of the working group, the
disagreements within the ABA are a reflection of interest group competition between the computer information
industry on the one hand and representatives of large firm licensees (and their lawyers) on the other: “The key
policy issue that confronts the Board of Governors in reviewing the Working Group’s report is whether narrow
parochial interest groups that have failed to win policy or political arguments in the... drafting process will have a
second chance to defeat... a NCCUSL approved statute.”   See Minority Report of Donald Cohn at 6. 
Contrast the current interest group clash over UCITA with the original efforts by Llewellyn to enact 
Article 2.  Interest group competition of this sort did not emerge, as Llewellyn recognized, because “the same
parties and the same types of party can tomorrow be occupying each the other end of similar disputes.”  In short,
since parties to commercial sales transactions are both buyers and sellers, there is no reason to believe that one
group or class is distributionally disadvantaged over the other. That symmetry of effects  is clearly not present in
the battle between the large firm licensors of computer information and their licensees.
Thus, the UCITA project is a further example of the effects of interest group competition in the private
legislative process.  The Schwartz/Scott model would predict  continuing deadlock within the three key  private
legislative groups -the ABA, the ALI and NCCUSL-over the enactment of a statutory scheme governing computer
information transactions.  Much as with the Article 2 revisions, the debate over UCITA centers of the question of
the appropriate domain of freedom of contract in mass market license transactions.  In the words of dissenting
member Cohn, “UCITA is and has always been intended as a commercial statute.  Some interest groups have
attempted to change UCITA into a national uniform consumer protection statute.  The problem...is a desire on the
part of various interest groups to require UCITA to include mandatory, non-waivable provisions to protect their
constituents, even large companies that do not need this type of protection.  The underlying current in the
opposition to UCITA is a desire for more mandatory provisions and not less.  More restrictions on freedom of
contract and not less.”  Id. at 8-9.     
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Virginia and Maryland, but has encountered stiff opposition from consumer interests in other
jurisdictions.125  
The split between the ALI and NCCUSL broke into the open in the summer of 1999 when
revised Article 2 and 2A were brought forward for final approval.  Revised Articles 2 and 2A
were approved by the ALI in May 1999 but, after encountering severe opposition from industry
interests, the leadership of NCCUSL suddenly  withdrew the drafts from consideration during its
126 There are differing explanations for the sudden decision by the NCCUSL leadership to withdraw the
July, 1999 draft.  The Reporter of the Article 2 drafting committee believes that the action followed a threat by the
so called “strong” sellers (i.e. General Electric and the Automobile Manufacturer’s Association) to oppose the
draft, if approved, in every state legislature.  See Speidel, View from the Trenches, supra note –  at 611,617-618.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 615-17.  As reported by the Director of the ALI to its members, the drafting committee was
asked “to preserve the substantive gains in the [earlier] version while restoring some of the language of the original
Article 2 with which lawyers and business people are comfortable.” Letter from Lance Liebman, ALI Director, to
the Members of the ALI, September 17, 1999.
129 See UCC § 2-102 and note —supra.
130 Liebman, Introduction, supra note --- at 1.
131Id at 2.
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annual meeting two months later.126  This action, in turn, prompted the Reporter and Associate
Reporter for the Revised Article 2 to resign.127 In an attempt to patch the tattered alliance
together, ALI and NCCUSL agreed on a newly reconstituted drafting committee covering both
articles, which was directed to focus on “non-controversial,” technical amendments to the
existing statute.128  Two years later, the new committee brought forward the Proposed 2001
Amendments to Article 2, which were approved (subject to several minor amendments) by the
ALI in May 2001.  Despite the uncertainties surrounding the jurisdiction of Article 2, UCITA, or
the common law over transactions in information products, especially “smart goods” that 
contain and are often controlled by computer programs, the drafting committee decided to retain
Article 2's original, open-ended scope provision.129  That decision was primarily a pragmatic
acceptance of the status quo since intense interest group competition was able to block the more
precise, bright-line alternatives suggested by either side. 
Following the ALI vote, the software and information interests continued to lobby
NCCUSL for changes in the scope provision.  Their interests were to prevent validation in the
new Article 2 of judicial decisions that applied (directly or by analogy) “buyer-friendly”
provisions of Article 2 to transactions in information and, concomitantly, to have the Article 2
amendments acknowledge the existence and applicability of UCITA.130  At the NCCUSL annual
meeting in August, the drafting committee agreed on new scope language that, while not referring
to UCITA, parallels to some extent the structure and substance of the UCITA scope provision. 
Brought to the floor, the new scope provision survived a motion to delete by a vote of 60 to 98.
NCCUSL also effectively reversed the ALI floor amendments to the statute of frauds and
liquidated damages provisions.  Finally, a motion to approve the new Article 2 failed by a vote
of 53 to 89,131 an action subsequently described as the “right and left ganging up to defeat the
132[e-mail posting from 8/15/01]
133Schwartz & Scott, Political Economy, supra note -- at 633-37.
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middle.”132
The open split between the ALI and NCCUSL is merely a symptom of the intense interest
group competition that has emerged during the Article 2 revision process.  Retail manufacturing
interests (the so-called “strong” sellers), opposed to provisions that extended warranty liability
for economic loss to remote sellers, were able successfully to block the adoption of the initial
revisions to Article 2.  In turn, consumer interests (including large firm licensees) opposed to the
“seller-friendly” provisions in the proposed Article 2B, were able to separate the computer
information article from the rest of the UCC project. From there the battleground  moved to rival
efforts to either secure or block the further enactment of UCITA. This included the tug-of-war
over efforts to acknowledge UCITA in the scope provisions of the revised Article 2.  Thus, in
the effort to bring forward the seemingly uncontroversial 2001 Amendments to Article 2, each
side was able to block approval of the other’s proposals but unable to secure approval of its
own. The resulting deadlock confirms the predictions of the Schwartz/Scott model that private
legislatures are strongly biased toward the status quo whenever their proposals encounter
substantial interest group competition.133 
It seems unlikely, therefore,  that Article 2 will be revised so as to deal directly with any
of the unique problems presented by  the new technology.  Whatever happens in the future, non-
Code legal regimes will be called upon to resolve the increasingly intense normative debate
over the domain of free contract in retail computer information transactions as well as to specify
the default rules to fill gaps in commercial information  transactions.  We are left with three
questions: First, what happened in the intervening fifty years  to change a reformer dominated
process, with little interest group involvement, to a process dominated by competing interest
groups?  Second, why has the resulting deadlock generated such little interest beyond the
affected interest groups and the academic reformers who are active participants in the private
legislative process?  Third, assuming the causes of deadlock and indifference can be identified,
what adverse effects on contracting are the likely consequences?
B.  Interest Group Competition over the Domain of Free Contract.  
There are, no doubt, many  reasons why the debate over how best to regulate
standardized contracting was framed as a “technical” or “practical” problem in 1950, but
emerged as a sharp clash over values fifty years later.   One of the salient facts, however, is that
Llewellyn’s solution to the tension between the freedom to contract out from legal defaults and
134 Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought, supra note – at  347.
135 Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 534-5 (1988) (“despite the
charter granted to the courts by the Uniform Commercial Code’s unconscionability provision, such decisions
remain especially rare in the realm of commercial and consumer sales.  The landmark decisions declining
enforcement of written provisions – decisions like Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. and Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.– are beginning to stand out in the casebooks as curiosities...”).
136 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 752 (1982) (“the
effect, if not the purpose, of this distinction [between procedural and substantive unconscionability] was to
domesticate unconscionability by accepting the concept insofar as it could be made harmonious with the bargain
principle (that is, insofar as it was ‘procedural’), while rejecting its wider implication that in appropriate cases the
courts might review bargains for fairness of terms.  Correspondingly, much of the scholarly literature and case law
concerning unconscionability has emphasized the element of unfair surprise...”); Scott & Kraus, CONTRACT LAW
AND THEORY at 567-560..
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the regulation of “unbalanced” transactions depended heavily on his institutionalist perspective.
Llewellyn saw groups, rather than individuals, as the key unit of analysis.   The question that
interested him was “how do groups work?”  He found the answer to this question in the group
norms that were the source of the tailored defaults (“working rules”) that permit flexible
adaptation within those groups. At the same time, these norms were the means of  regulating the
outlier behavior of “contract-dodgers and chiselers.”  Article 2 incorporates this institutionalist
conception through its focus on the trade usages and commercial practices of groups of
merchants.  In that sense, the contemporary notion of interest groups–individuals bound together
not by what work they do but by their effort to secure common political outcomes, was simply
foreign to Llewellyn and the social scientists who influenced him.  As Allen Kamp puts it, “The
consumer group is a product of our consumption-driven, individualistic society.  It is hard to
reconceptualize the Code to include it.” 134
The most vivid illustration of this methodological divide has been the experience with
the doctrine of unconscionability.  The unconscionability provision as it has come to be applied
by courts bears little relation to its original conception.  Most courts have adopted Llewellyn’s
two part test, but have applied the doctrine more narrowly than he envisioned.135  Procedural
unconscionability has been most commonly found in standard form contracts where significant
risks are shifted from sellers to buyers through inconspicuous and/or obscure terms.  In turn,
courts find such risk allocations substantively unconscionable  if the risk in question
materializes.  Viewed ex post, therefore, the two tests are effectively collapsed into one.   In
effect, the unconscionability doctrine has become a straightforward  extension of the  common
law doctrine of fraudulent concealment, designed to police the practice of “concealing” key
terms in standardized agreements.136 The lesson for sellers in mass market transactions,
therefore, has been to use bold print, clear language and other similar prophylactics to insulate
137Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk, supra note— at 174 (For Llewellyn, “‘custom’,
‘the law merchant’ and ‘reasonableness’ were not terms of substantive law , but procedural directives, indications
to a court that it should refer its decision to lay specialists with a feel for commercial law.”); Scott & Schwartz,
Sales Law and the Contracting Process at 5 (“The admonition to act in a commercially reasonable manner
functions as an empirical directive: to decide if the parties have acted reasonably, the decision maker must look to
the marketplace and observe relevant commercial behavior to determine the legal norm.”)
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important risk allocations from subsequent attack.  In sum, unconscionability has become an ex
post litigation strategy by which  individual consumers can shift losses back to careless sellers. 
But the unconscionability litigation has failed to generate any new legal rules that redraw the
boundaries of free contract in mass market transactions. 
 Contemporary analysis has shifted to a focus on methodological individualism. 
Neoclassical economics justifies default rules by reference to the savings that they offer to
bargainers who need not specify an alternative allocation of risks and by the freedom of
idiosyncratic bargainers to opt out.  Consumer advocates argue for judicial regulation of
standardized contracts on the grounds that individual assent is absent.  In both cases, therefore,
autonomy interests justify conflicting policy prescriptions: the “right” to contract out on the one
hand, and the “right” to dicker individually over contract terms on the other.  In a world that
focuses on “rights,” the normative objectives of filling gaps with efficient defaults  and
regulating unbalanced bargains are fundamentally in conflict.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that a
single statutory scheme can no longer accommodate both objectives without stimulating value
conflicts that the private legislative process is ill suited to resolve. In sum,  Llewellyn’s Article
2 assumes that there are “technical” resolutions to contested normative questions.  The private
legislative process is peculiarly ill equipped to deal with the regulation of consumer transactions
precisely because it lacks the capacity to accommodate the underlying, competing values.
C.  The “Corbinization” of Article 2 Default Rules and the Exit of Commercial
Contracting.
We can only speculate about why so few seem to care about the deadlock in the Article 2
revision process. What we do know is that the incorporation mechanism introduced by Llewellyn has
not functioned as he intended.  Llewellyn intended the key instruction to courts--focus on
commercially reasonable merchant practices-- as a direction to examine the relevant contracting
environment and then (presumably over time) to announce ex ante defaults that would apply to
particular populations of commercial parties.137  But the abandonment of the merchant tribunal
doomed this effort from the start.  There is substantial evidence that courts have consistently
interpreted these statutory instructions not as inductive directions to incorporate commercial norms
but rather as invitations to use context as a source of subjective meaning–a determination of what the
138 A LEXIS search for cases of the past ten years that invoke commercial reasonableness in close
conjunction with the mention of at least one Article 2 section returned 164 hits.  A detailed examination of fifty-
five cases randomly selected from this base pool revealed only two cases where the court viewed the commercial
reasonableness question as requiring an inquiry into actual commercial practice.  In eighteen other cases, the court
used an intuitive, subjective approach, evaluating commercial reasonableness in terms of  whether the particular
contracting parties acted reasonably under the contextual circumstances.  The remaining cases either dealt
tangentially with commercial reasonableness or dealt principally with commercial reasonableness under other
sections of the Code.  See Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note – at n. 68.
139 Scott, Uniformity Norm, supra note – at 170-172.   The decision to create a code was combined with
the political instincts not to publicize the project as a codification.  William Hawkland, who served as Llewellyn’s
research assistant, suggests that if Llewellyn had publicized his intention to codify the commercial law, the UCC
“probably would have died aborning.”  William Hawkland, The UCC and the Civil Codes, 56 La. L. Rev. 23, 33
(1995).
140Hawkland , UCC and Civil Codes, supra note --at 23-25; William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial
“Code” Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L. F. 291.
141 UCC §1-102 (1994).
142 Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 330,333 (1951).
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parties to the particular dispute “must have meant” by their agreement.138  
 
There are several reasons why this ex post perspective has been the dominant interpretive
strategy under the Code.  I have argued elsewhere that one reason was the (primarily instrumental)
decision by Llewellyn and his colleagues to create a “true commercial code.” 139  To the extent that a
code is a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive enactment of a field of law, it dictates a
different interpretive methodology than that of the common law or ordinary commercial statutes.
When a court in interpreting a code confronts a gap in an incomplete contract, its duty  is to use the
processes of analogy and extrapolation to find a solution consistent with the purposes and policy of
the codifying law.  In this way, the code itself provides the best evidence of what it means.140  In other
words, a code has a systematic method of filling gaps through a self-referential process that divines
the purposes of the enactment.  In the UCC, this methodology is specified in section 1-102, which
directs courts to liberally construe and apply the specific provisions of the act  “to promote its
underlying purposes and policies.” 141  In short, the Code not only has the force of law but it is a
source of law.142   The net effect of this institutional design is a highly contextualized interpretive
methodology, one that embeds the explicit terms of a contract within the larger jurisprudential context
of the Code as well as within the specific commercial context. 
In addition,  subjective modes of interpretation were widely accepted by many, if not most of
the contract scholars who opined on the meaning of the new statute.  Following the lead of Arthur
143 See e.g., 3 A. Corbin,  CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 538 (1960).
144Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn,
Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169, 189-90 (1989).  The distinction between
context as a source of ex ante defaults and context as a tool for ex post interpretation is both important and subtle. 
The point can best be illuminated by an example.  Assume Seller contracts for $1,000 to manufacture and deliver
100 widgets to Buyer in six months. On the date of delivery, Seller tenders the widgets and Buyer refuses to pay
the contract price alleging that there is a usage of trade in this industry that, if certain market conditions occur, the
price is subject to an adjustment of up to 50%.  Llewellyn would admit this evidence to  to determine what the
relevant trade understood the price term to mean and would ideally have asked the merchant tribunal to affirm the
existence and nature of the usage.  The outcome of the case would turn or their judgment about the usage and,
following the decision, that judgment would then be available to guide future parties. The ex post interpreter, on
the other hand, would admit the evidence in aid of determining what these parties really meant by the fixed price
contract term.  The judgment as to their intent is for the court and can be based on no more evidence than the
parties testimony as to what they  understood the contract to mean. Moreover, their intent has no necessary
relevance in determining the intention of other parties similarly situated.  
145 Interpretive questions are complex and this complexity has obscured the scholarly debate over the
choice between contextual and textual modes of interpretation.  To begin to sort the problems out, consider two
polar interpretive stances: (a) pure textualism: The interpreter considers only a contract’s written text when
deciding what the contract directed; (b) pure contextualism: The interpreter does not privilege the written words
over any other relevant evidence of the parties’ intentions, such as the negotiations that preceded the contract, the
parties practice under it, and any customary meaning of a contract term.  Courts properly reject both “pure”
interpretive stances.  Words derive meaning from the context in which they are used, thereby justifying a court in
rejecting pure textualism.  On the other hand, the writing often is the best evidence of the parties’ intentions
because parties intend the writing to be the best evidence, thereby justifying a court in rejecting “pure”
contextualism.  The interesting questions, therefore, concern where an interpreter should locate herself on the
continuum between pure textualism and pure contextualism.  See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Normative
Foundations of Commercial Contract Law (forthcoming 2002).
In answering this question, it is useful to identify three canonical cases where courts will be called upon
to interpret the meaning of incomplete contracts.   The first case involves the interpretation of contract terms that
are linguistically vague or ambiguous.  When a single contract term has more than one possible meaning, the same
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Corbin, courts interpreting the Code were advised to use context evidence to ascertain the mental
states of the parties.  To Corbin and other Code commentators, therefore,  context was an occasion
for recovering the intention of the parties in litigation, not an occasion for promulgating default rules
derived from commercial practices.143 Courts thus disregarded Llewellyn’s intention that, in
construing the meaning of sales contracts, a court should  focus on what the relevant usage of trade
took the contract to mean and not on what the parties mentally intended.  As Dennis Patterson has
pointed out, Llewellyn’s search for ex ante default rules was closer to Williston than to the post-
Code adherents of subjective intention.144 
Whatever the merits of such an ex post strategy in ensuring a just resolution of disputes
between contesting parties, the method carries costs for future contracting parties who are less able to
devise “working rules” for predicting how contractual terms and language will be interpreted in
subsequent transactions.145  The irony, in the case of a uniform code, is that the ex post  method impairs
set of factual conditions may generate alternate sets of prescribed consequences. Such ambiguity is normally
unintended. Thus, in most instances, had the possibility of the dispute-triggering conditions been pointed out in
advance, the parties could have reformulated the terms so as to remove the ambiguity and would have preferred to
so rectify the error. When unresolvable controversies arise over the meaning of “ambiguous” contractual language,
the parties must resort to a third party interpreter.  A classic example of this first interpretive task is  Frigaliment
Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“The issue is, what is chicken?”). 
Here contextual evidence is generally admissible on the sensible grounds that it produces greater accuracy in
ascertaining the parties intentions.  There is a trade-off, however, between accurate interpretation of the disputed
contract and the promulgation of interpretive rules (such as the plain meaning rule) designed to encourage cost-
effective precautions in contract drafting.
A second interpretive challenge arises when the parties dispute the meaning of facially unambiguous
express contract language that purports to opt out of a state-created or customary default rule.  Thus, for example,
a seller may urge the enforcement of a contract term that calls for the buyer to purchase 70,000 cubic yards of
cement.  The contract further provides that “no conditions which are not incorporated in this contract will be
recognized.”  The buyer defends by claiming that, customarily, parties in the trade understand such quantity terms
as only estimates subject to renegotiation.  See Southern  Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc.,
407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975).  Here the risk is that, unless the court privileges the written agreement by
excluding the contextual evidence, parties such as the buyer will be motivated to dispute the meaning of perfectly
communicative contract terms as a strategic response to a now disfavored contract.
The third canonical case has not been well recognized by courts or commentators.  The contract may be
incomplete because it is insufficiently “state contingent,” that is, there are a number of possible future states about
which the contract is silent.  In this case, a court intent on admitting context evidence to determine the parties
actual intent will do damage to future contracting if it completes the contract in a way that the parties themselves
never would have agreed to. Thus, for example, if a buyer cannot observe or verify the value of a relevant economic
parameter, such as the seller’s costs, the buyer will reject a contract that conditions on that parameter because of
the risk that the seller will behave strategically.  Here, a contextualist interpretive approach increases the risk of ex
post strategic behavior relative to a textualist approach.  Thus, there is a trade-off between the presumed benefits
of greater accuracy in finding what the parties at bar intended and the likelihood that parties in general will be
induced by a court’s interpretive rules to shift to less efficient contracts.  Id.
146 Scott, The Uniformity Norm, supra note – at 152.                                                          
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genuine, “substantive” uniformity.”  An interpretation is “substantively uniform” when it is transparent
to the litigating parties and predictable to other parties.  Uniform interpretation thus has both a
jurisdictional and a temporal dimension.  One uniformity value is for parties to know at the time they
write contracts that their verifiable obligations will be interpreted in the same manner by courts in
different jurisdictions.  In addition, uniformity values are enhanced if parties are certain that courts in
any given jurisdiction will interpret their verifiable obligations uniformly over time.  If the state
performs this function inconsistently, the costs of contracting will rise.146 
Casual observation suggests that the risk of unpredictable interpretation has increased for
commercial parties under the Code.  Courts under the Code have interpreted the meaning of express
terms in a contract by looking to the commercial context to determine what the words mean.  While
this may seem perfectly logical (the parties negotiated the contract in a particular context, so courts
should look to that context to determine what the parties meant by the words they used), this
147Id. at 164.  See, e.g., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F. 2d 355 (4th Cir. 1980);
Steuber Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 646 F2d. 1093 (5th Cir. 1981); Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664
F2d. 772 (9th Cir. 1981); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster, 451 F2d. 3 (4th Cir. 1971); Modine Mfg. Co. v.
North E. Independent School Dist., 503 S.W. 2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
148A transition to new default terms and different interpretive rules requires parties to first develop and
then groups of contractors to coordinate their joint adoption of a standard formulation of the novel terms.  So long
as parties must bear the full costs of developing  novel contract terms but are incapable of capturing the full
benefits of their innovative efforts, novel terms will be under-produced.  Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choice, supra
note – at 283-86.   
149 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking The Code’s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1772-1777 (1996).
150 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through
Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).
151A number of other trade associations have codified trade rules that govern intra-industry contracts and
that are subject to arbitration under trade-specified rules of interpretation,.  See, e.g., American Fats and Oils
Association, American Tin Trade Association, Association of Food Industries, Diamond Dealers Club, General
Arbitration Council of the Textile and Apparel Industries (Worth Street Rules), National Hay Association, North
American Lumber Association, Rubber Trade Association, Tea Association of the USA. Bernstein, Merchant Law,
supra note – at n. 134.
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interpretive approach injects a bias into the process.  Giving the commercial context interpretive
priority subverts the efforts of those commercial parties who wish to opt out of the relevant
commercial context.147  Moreover, these uncertainty and error costs are not the sole effects of
interpretation bias under the Code. An ex post or subjective strategy of interpretation also undermines
Llewellyn’s original goal of increasing the supply of legally sanctioned default terms that subsequent
parties could use in formulating their agreements.  
Uncertainty is a deadweight cost and contracting parties have substantial incentives to reduce
these contracting costs. Whether causally linked or not, the dominance of ex post interpretation has
coincided with the exit from the Code by important classes of commercial parties.  Exit has taken
several different forms.  Commercial trade associations are able to solve the collective action
problems that otherwise impede contractual innovation.148  They can and have devised substitute sets
of substantive rules for intragroup transactions that are then subject to binding arbitration.  The trade
rules governing the contracts between members of the National Grain and Feed Association,149 the
American Cotton Shippers Association and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute,150 and many
other trade associations,151 create private legal systems for resolving contract disputes among
themselves.  These rules substitute clear, bright-line rules and  objective modes of interpretation in
152 In enforcing arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court has held that 
arbitration procedures, including the principles governing the interpretation of the agreement, may be specified by
the  agreement itself.  See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).  (“Just as parties may limit
by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules under which the
arbitration will be conducted.”) 
153 Id at 1775-82.
154In the place of Code warranties and the rules for rejection, revocation, cure, etc., parties who trade in
hard goods, most especially in sales of equipment, substitute standardized “repair and replacement” clauses.  Such
clauses purport to divide quality risks between buyer and seller and to displace the binary default rules governing
revocation of acceptance and cure.  See Schwartz & Scott, SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS, supra
note – at 204-09.  One of the reasons that may have contributed to the increase in agreements to arbitrate disputes
under the standard  clause are the inconsistent interpretations of the repair and replacement clause in different
jurisdictions.  Compare, e.g., Myrtle Beach Pipeline Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027 (D.S.C.
1993) with Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Construction, Inc., 540 P.2d 978 (Haw. 1975) and International
Financial Services, Inc.  v. Franz, 23 UCC Rep. 2d 1078 (Minn. 1994) with Chattlos v. NCR, 635 F. 2d 1081 (3d
Cir. 1986).  
155  See, e.g., a standard “excusable delay” clause: “Seller shall not be responsible nor deemed to be in
default on account of delays in performance...due to causes beyond Seller’s control and not occasioned by its fault
or negligence, including but not limited to..any act of government, governmental priorities, allocation regulations
or orders affecting materials, equipment...failure of vendors (due to cause similar to those within the scope of this
clause) to perform their contracts...,provided such cause is beyond Seller’s control.”  
156  See, e.g., Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Products, Inc. 261 Or. 480, 492, 495
P.2d 744, 749 (1972) (standard insecurity clause in  industrial association’s  “Terms and Conditions of Quotation
and Sale” construed as an enforceable variation of §2-609 by agreement of the parties).
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place of the Code’s vague rules and subjective, contextualized approach to interpretation.152  For
whatever reason, these groups evidence a preference for acontextual (and thus more certain) modes of
interpretation.  In so doing, they decline to judicialize the more flexible relational norms that control
strategic behavior in their ongoing relationships.153   
Parties to inter-industry contracts generally cannot (and do not) opt out of the Code entirely. 
But they can and do opt out of the Code’s ill-fitting default rules and its preference for highly
contextualized  interpretation. Here the strategy is to develop standard terms that create customized
risk allocations for commonly arising risks, such as the risk of product defects.  There are a number of
common examples of these customized terms.   The standard “repair and replacement” clause replaces
the Code’s warranty rules as well as the rules governing rejection and cure.  This standard provision
governs most commercial equipment sales today.154  Exculpatory or force majeure clauses replace
Code provisions governing performance and excuse.155  Finally, the standard “contractual insecurity”
clause displaces Code rules governing insecurity and anticipatory repudiation.156  In each case, there is
growing anecdotal evidence that inconsistent judicial interpretations of these standard terms under the
Code regime of  subjective interpretation has stimulated the substitution of compulsory arbitration to
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resolve disputes over liability under these customized clauses.
CONCLUSION
There are no reliable measures of the extent to which commercial parties have opted out of the
Code, either in whole or in part.  But casual observation points to an hypothesis: Article 2 has  failed
to provide many commercial parties with reliable (i.e., uniform) rules that reduce contracting costs. 
The dominance of subjective modes of interpretation imposes uncertainty costs without providing the
corresponding benefits of incorporation.  Some classes of commercial contractors have exited
entirely; others have opted out of particular portions of the statute.  In any case, the upshot is a statute
that is less relevant to many (if not most) commercial parties.  Commercial interests have left the field
to mass market transactions and to the resulting clashes over the legal regulation of form contracting in
these markets. 
Does any of this matter to anyone other than those whose professional expertise involves
advising others about the meaning of the Code?   The major cost of wholesale opting out is the loss of
the social benefits that derive from judicial resolution of disputed contracts.  Commercial arbitration
decisions remain unpublished for the most part.  This means that the positive externalities that result
from authoritative resolution of disputed contracts are sacrificed.  The state facilitates the contracting
process to the extent that courts in the process of interpretation create standardized (or uniform) terms
that future parties can use in signaling their intentions.  These standardized signals are developed in
two ways.  The first is through gap filling, the specification of default rules that complete incomplete
contracts.  The second method of standardization occurs when courts interpret authoritatively the
meaning of invocations or standard form terms and clauses that parties frequently use in writing
contracts.  In either case, the primary role of the state in regulating incomplete contracts is the
standardization of the meaning and jurisdiction of the state-supplied defaults and the privately
provided invocations from which parties can customize their contracts. Substituting unpublished
arbitration decisions for published judicial opinions thus represents a real social cost. In this sense,
then, Article 2 threatens to become a uniform statute that provides the parties who rely on it few, if
any, of the benefits that inhere in uniformity.
These costs might be offset by the social benefits inherent in a normatively acceptable regime
for regulating standard form contracting or computer information transactions.  But this task is one that
recent evidence shows the Code is peculiarly incapable of performing. Contrast, for example,  the
current interest group clash over UCITA with the original efforts by Llewellyn to enact Article 2. 
Interest group competition of that sort did not emerge, as Llewellyn recognized, because “the same
parties and the same types of party can tomorrow be occupying each the other end of similar
157 Karl Llewellyn,  Across Sales on Horseback, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 725-26 (1939). 
158 The argument is slightly different in those cases, such as Articles 3, 4 and 9 where the distributional
effects are both asymmetric and unevenly spread between a few concentrated winners and many diffused losers.  In
those cases, there is a respectable argument that even if the political deals are fully priced out in the resulting
contracts, the costs are too high because it is inefficient for many diffused losers to adjust to individual
transactions that favor the winners.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L. J. 857 (1996). 
159 In this latter case, the argument is that the market will price inefficiently because of market
imperfections such as monopoly power or asymmetric information. Moreover, any such distributional effects  are
likely to be redistribute wealth from the relatively poor and uniformed to the rich and sophisticated. Robert E.
Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1436 (1997).
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disputes.”157  In short, since parties to commercial sales transactions are both buyers and sellers, there
is no reason to believe that one group or class is disadvantaged over the other. That symmetry of
effects is clearly not present in the battle between the large firm licensors of computer information and
their licensees (whether the licensees are large firms or individual consumers).  
In sum, uniformity worked when there was symmetry (when today's buyer might be tomorrow's
seller) and Article 2 has always had great success in that subpart of contract law.  Indeed many of the
vague provisions that remain in the original Article 2 coincide with distributional asymmetries,  and
one can surmise that Llewellyn avoided interest group competition by drafting vague rules in just those
instances.  But where the distributional effects were symmetric, the evidence suggests that Llewellyn
worked with more effort and effect  to find the best possible default rule, unless there  was real reason
to think judges could do better on the ground later on.
            Viewed from that perspective, the extension of the Code to Article  2A (Leases) was a big step
for the ALI and NCCUSL because lease transactions are not entirely symmetrical.  On the other hand
there likely were significant gains to uniformity in enacting 2A, and, in any event, even if there were
political deals, they were not worth much because they could subsequently  be priced in the lease
contract.  In other words, if lessors got better rules in Article 2A than they would obtain in freely
dickered, customized contracts, then the Code-regulated contract would result in giving lessors slightly
worse prices.158  But the same cannot be said for many consumer transactions and perhaps not for
computer information contracts under proposed Article 2B. On this view,  the breakdown occurred
where you might expect it, where the distributional effects were asymmetric and the pricing effects
were uncertain.159
One normative implication of the deadlock over the revisions to Article 2, therefore, is that the
ALI and NCCUSL should not propose uniform rules for transactions where the distributional effects
are asymmetric and prices are unlikely to adjust efficiently so as to compensate for a single group’s
160 Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and The Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of
a Draftsman, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1981).
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victory in the legislative process.  These issues are better resolved in the ordinary political process
where competing value claims can be accommodated more effectively.  When it was first enacted,
Article 2 created social value by removing the detritus of common law notions of title from sales law. 
It has served us continuously, if not always well, for fifty years.  But the methodological premises
which formed the foundation of the distributional judgments in the statute are no longer widely shared. 
A statute created to incorporate the group ideology of institutionalism is ill-suited as a template for
regulation in an era whose ideology is self-consciously individualistic. As Grant Gilmore famously
said, Karl Llewellyn was “always willing–indeed eager–to rethink his own earlier formulations....To
Llewellyn the ultimate absurdity would have been not to be able to improve on what [he] had written
[fifty] years earlier.”160   
